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PRECEDENT LOST: WHY ENCOURAGE
SETTLEMENT, AND WHY PERMIT NON-PARTY
INVOLVEMENT IN SETTLEMENTS?
Leandra Lederman*
INTRODUCrON
Settlement happens. In fact, settlement is the usual outcome of
any dispute, and trials are the exception.' Even considering only
cases actually docketed, approximately ninety percent settle,2 and
many additional disputes settle before docketing. Precedent, on the
other hand, does notjust "happen." Ajudicial precedent requires not
only an aggrieved party who files a lawsuit, but also that the case goes
to trial, and perhaps appeal, without a settlement.3 A trial may be a
"failure,"4 but a trial is a prerequisite to precedent, and precedent is
the cornerstone of our common law system. Settlement and prece-
dent are therefore in tension with each other.
* Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. A.B. 1987, Bryn
Mawr College; J.D. 1990, New York University School of Law; L.L.M. 1993, New York
University School of Law. The author would like to thank Bruce Kobayashi, Maxwell
Steams, Todd Zywicki, and workshop participants at Boston University School of Law
for their excellent comments; David Hyman and Mark Newton for helpful discussions;
Robert S. Taylor for valuable research assistance; and the Law and Economics Center
of George Mason University School of Law for financial support.
1 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 498 (1991) (stating that five percent or
fewer of litigated cases are tried to judgment) (citing Annual Report of the Director,
Administrative Officer of the United States Courts, 1987 REPORTS OF THE PROCuxDNGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES 211); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 405 n.126 (1982) ("Eighty-five to ninety percent of all
federal civil suits end by settlement."); cf H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed Is Justice Ru-
ined, 38 RuTGERS L. Rxv. 431, 431 (1986) ("The study of law focuses on reported cases,
which represent about two or three percent of all suits which are instituted.").
2 See Alexander, supra note 1.
3 This Article uses the term "precedent" to refer to case law that can influence a
later decision in the same court or a lower court.
4 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotia-
tions and the Selection of Cases for Trial 90 MICH. L. REv. 319, 320 (1991).
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Litigants control most aspects of litigation and generally control
whether and when they settle. Litigants, both actual and prospective,
have strong incentives to settle because the costs of litigation so out-
weigh the costs of settlement. 5 Given the fact that the overwhelming
majority of cases settle, and given the public value of precedent,6 one
might seek to encourage trials, at least in cases that stand to resolve
controversial issues. Instead, courts, commentators, and federal pol-
icy seem to favor settlement,7 while little attention is given to prece-
dent that may be lost in the process.8
The favoritism of settlement is consistent with the view that litiga-
tion serves as a dispute resolution mechanism. 9 Under this view,
bringing peace to the parties is paramount, 10 and precedent created
through court decisions is a "mere byproduct" of the dispute resolu-
tion process."I As this approach to precedent reveals, the dispute res-
olution model of litigation focuses on the private costs and benefits of
litigation or settlement. Owen Fiss, by contrast, views courts as institu-
tions that help illuminate public values.12 He therefore purports to be
"against" settlement.13 Of course, each of these views explains only a
part of the litigation process. In fact, all litigation has both public and
private aspects. 14 Public money funds courts and pays judges' salaries.
Yet, because of justiciability doctrine, most courts, and federal courts
in particular, do not decide cases unless there is a live dispute between
adverse parties.' 5 An appropriate model of the litigation process
should balance both private and public roles in litigation, to illumi-
nate the roles of both precedent and settlement. This Article seeks to
develop that model.
Part I of the Article develops the more basic model of the proto-
typical litigation, in which the parties are the ones who bargain over
settlement, and non-parties are not involved. It explores how even in
this simple scenario, private and public concerns over settlement and
5 See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
6 Precedent helps non-litigants shape their conduct. People also settle disputes
"in the shadow of the law," and that law includes precedent. Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ.
950 (1979).
7 See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
8 But cf Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984).
9 See infra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
11 See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
12 See Fiss, supra note 8.
13 See generally id.
14 See infta notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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precedent conflict. It also examines how settlement nonrandomly af-
fects the substantive content of precedent, as well as the path depen-
dence of precedent.
Part II complicates the model. It considers the question of the
proper role of settlement and precedent in litigation influenced by
third-party interest groups. This Part considers the effect of third-
party maneuvering in both Article III cases, using the controversial
settlement in Piscataway Township Board of Education v. Taxmani6 as an
example, and in Article I cases, using as an example Smith v. Commis-
sioner,17 a tax shelter case involving an unsuccessful third-party attempt
to engineer a settlement.
Part III of the Article draws on the model developed in Part I, in
order to gain insights into the public and private factors in litigation
and settlement in Article I courts and in Article III courts. In part,
Part I seeks to answer the question of why courts generally en-
courage settlement, looking at judges' own incentives to encourage
settlement, as well as the extent to which the encouragement in-
creases overall efficiency. The Article concludes that we need to bal-
ance the importance of precedent against the benefits of settlement
when considering whether to have a general approach to encouraging
settlement.
I. CONCEPTUALIZING LITIGATION: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
CONCERNS IN CONFLICT
A. Theoretical Models of Litigation
Litigation has traditionally been viewed as a "dispute resolution"
mechanism.' 8 "Under the dispute resolution model, a passive, impar-
tial judge settles a self-contained contested transaction between two
16 521 U.S. 1117 (1997).
17 78 T.C. 350 (1982), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1987).
18 See William D. Zellar, Avoiding Issue Preclusion by Settlement Conditioned upon the
Vacatur of EnteredJudgments, 96 YALE LJ. 860, 871 (1987).
Five elements characterize our 'received tradition' of adjudication. First, the
lawsuit is bipolar, engaging two diametrically opposed parties. Second, lid-
gation is retrospective; the dispute concerns discrete, complete, past events.
Third, right and remedy are interdependent. Fourth, actions are self-con-
tained:Judgment affects only the two parties and terminates judicial involve-
ment. Finally, litigation is party-initiated and party-controlled.
Id.; see also Fiss, supra note 8, at 1075 ("The advocates of A.D.R. are led to support
such measures and to exalt the idea of settlement more generally because they view
adjudication as a process to resolve disputes. They act as though courts arose to re-
solve quarrels between neighbors who had reached an impasse and turned to a stran-
ger for help.").
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private parties-a plaintiff seeking redress for an injury inflicted by a
directly adverse defendant."19 In this view, settlement is a matter of
private contract, 20 a peaceful resolution to a private dispute through
negotiated compromise. 21 Such compromise is instinctively favored
over what is in effect a civilized battle between adversaries. 22 The dis-
pute resolution model views precedent as a "mere byproduct" of the
parties' dispute,23 minimizing its importance in the calculus of
whether to encourage settlement.
Because of the justiciability constraints in Article III courts,24 Arti-
cle III cases generally fit the dispute resolution model of litigation very
neatly.25 That is, in courts created under the authority of Article III of
the Constitution,26 evolution of the law occurs only in actual disputes
that arise between adverse parties. And in justiciability doctrine, as
predicted by the dispute resolution model, third-party concerns about
precedent play no role. "Consideration of standing, ripeness and
19 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Func-
tions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 458 n.62 (1994).
20 See Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 9, 9 (1996) ("American law treats the settlement agreement as a mem-
ber of the larger family of private contracts.").
21 See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle":'Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1371 (1994) ("Settlement typically in-
volves arriving at a position between the original offers and demands of the parties.
Thus, it involves a process of compromise in the sense that each has sacrificed some
part of his claim in order to secure another part.").
22 Owen Fiss states,
The dispute resolution story makes settlement appear as a perfect substitute
for judgment, as we just saw, by trivializing the remedial dimensions of a
lawsuit, and also by reducing the social function of the lawsuit to one of
resolving private disputes. In that story, settlement appears to achieve ex-
actly the same purpose as judgment-peace between the parties-but at
considerably less expense to society.
Fiss, supra note 8, at 1085.
23 See Pushaw, supra note 19, at 460 n.62 ("Under the dispute resolution
model . .. [a]ny law declaration is a mere byproduct of resolving the dispute.").
24 See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
25 See Pushaw, supra note 19, at 447-48 ("[J]usticiability presupposes that a fed-
eral judge's primary function is to resolve disputes, not to declare the law.").
26 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States... and to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party.... ."). The jurisdiction of a
court created under Article III of the United States Constitution is therefore limited
to cases and controversies. See id. art. III. The requirement that a case be "justiciable"
stems from this clause. See id.
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mootness is made without regard to whether a court's judgment
might have collateral benefits to nonparties."27
From the parties' perspective, the dispute resolution model also
fits. Generally, a plaintiff initiates a dispute because he feels he has a
right that has been infringed, for which there is a legal remedy. The
plaintiff and defendant each consider whether to settle the suit in
light of the court's likely ruling should the matter go to trial.28 In a
nutshell, the reason so many cases settle is because the alternative to
settlement is litigation,29 which is generally quite costly.30 By settling,
the parties save the amounts each would have spent to go to trial.
This creates a "surplus" that the parties can divide between them, en-
abling them to reach a settlement that renders each party better off
than he would have been had he incurred litigation costs.3' The par-
27 Andrea I. Feirstein, Note, Smith v. Commissioner: Unilateral Concessions by Tax-
payers, 4 VA. TAx Rrv. 187, 198 (1984).
28 Cf. Fiss, supra note 8, at 1086 ("[S]ettlement is controlled by the litigants, and
is subject to their private motivations and all the vagaries of the bargaining process.").
29 Settlement is inherently tied to litigation, particularly in cases in which suit has
been filed. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 500.
30 See, e.g., No AccEss TO LAW 58 (Laura Nader ed., 1980); FRED WARSHOFSKY,
THE PATEr WARS: THE BAaE TO OwN TH WORLD'S TECHNOLOGY 247-48 (1994)
(explaining that patent litigation is so costly that its mere threat may prevent a com-
pany from forming or from offering a new product); Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant
Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effec-
tive, 27 BuFF. L. Rxv. 181, 186-87 & n.11 (1978) (stating that studies show that litiga-
tion can cost up to one-half of the amount in dispute); Susan S. Silbey, Case Processing:
Consumer Protection in an Attorney General's Office, 15 LAw & Soc'Y Rv. 849, 865, 875-76
(1980-81); David M. Trubek et al., The Cost of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72,
84 n.31 (1983) ("There is substantial evidence that many minor disputes have
amounts in dispute less than would be the cost of a lawyer's time to process them.")
(citing Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAw & Soc'Y Rxv.
115, 129-30 (1979), and Silbey, supra, at 865, 875-76); see also Trubek et al., supra, at
113 ("The results strengthen the impression that plaintiffs get a higher return from a
strategy oriented to settlement than from one geared toward formal adjudication.
Thus the recovery to fee ratio is higher when the attorney spends relatively more time
on settlement discussions, but is lower when he devotes relatively more time to legal
research.").
31 See Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 29
(1995) (stating that settling saves litigation costs, so parties can divide surplus created
by not litigating); James D. Miller, Using Lotteries to Expand the Range of Litigation Settle-
ments, 26J. LEGAL STuD. 69, 69 (1997) ("Litigating parties incur deadweight losses that
they could avoid if they settled their case."); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion: An Economic Analysis, 24J. LEGAL STU. 1, 11 (1995) ("IT]he difference between
the plaintiff's expected judgment and the defendant's expected judgment must ex-
ceed the sum of their trial costs for there to be a trial; otherwise they will settle to save
trial costs. This makes sense, in that the two parties together will save the sum of their
trial costs if they settle.") (footnote omitted).
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ties do not internalize costs or benefits to third parties. Thus, the po-
tential precedential value of a court decision will factor into
settlement only to the extent that the precedent would have value to
one or both parties to the litigation itself.32
Owen Fiss's well-known article, Against Settlement,33 challenges the
dispute resolution litigation paradigm, 34 propounding an alternative,
"public values" view for some types of litigation,35 a view that focuses
on the role of courts in expounding society's values.3 6 A move away
from the dispute resolution paradigm of litigation to an awareness of
the "public values" perspective of litigation should entail weighing the
parties' interest in settling against the public interest in precedent,
although Fiss does not expressly do so. 3 7
The "public values" perspective is a minority view that does not
seem to have obtained widespread support among courts,3 8 and in
fact, it reflects a false dichotomy with the dispute resolution view of
32 Thus, in the economic model of suit and settlement, precedent becomes rele-
vant only where one or both parties is a "repeat player," that is, a repeat litigant on the
issue or issues in the case.
33 Fiss, supra note 8.
34 See id. at 1082 ("The dispute resolution story trivializes the remedial dimen-
sions of lawsuits and mistakenly assumes judgment to be the end of the process.").
35 See id. at 1075 ("Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea bargaining:
Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without authority;
the absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement trouble-
some; and although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done. Like plea bargain-
ing, settlement is a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be
neither encouraged nor praised."); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term, Foreword: The Terms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconsti-
tutionalizingJusticiability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARv. L. REV. 605, 626 (1992).
36 See Fiss, supra note 8, at 1083 ("The structural reform cases that play such a
prominent role on the federal docket provide another occasion for continuing judi-
cial involvement. In these cases, courts seek to safeguard public values by restructur-
ing large-scale bureaucratic organizations."); id. at 1085 ("In my view, however, the
purpose of adjudication should be understood in broader terms. Adjudication uses
public resources, and employs not strangers chosen by the parties but public officials
chosen by a process in which the public participates. These officials, like members of
the legislative and executive branches, possess a power that has been defined and
conferred by public law, not by private agreement. Their job is not to maximize the
ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force
to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to
interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them. This duty is not
discharged when the parties settle."). Fiss views settlement as "a highly problematic
technique for streamlining dockets." Id. at 1075.
37 See id.
38 This may be because the dispute resolution view is more aligned with judges'
interests in encouraging settlement. See infra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
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litigation.3 9 All litigation includes both private40 and public aspects. 4'
That is, most federal litigation requires a private dispute42 because Ar-
ticle III courts can generally consider only "live" disputes between ad-
verse parties. 43 Yet, public resources are used to provide courts-and
a court's opinion serves as precedent 44 -a public good.45 In fact,
"U]udicial decisions serve two main functions. First, they resolve the
immediate dispute between the parties. Second, they often provide
some guidance for future conduct. '46 Be that as it may, the dispute
39 See E. Donald Elliott, Symposium on Litigation Management: Managerial Judging
and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CH. L. REv. 306, 325 (1986) ("Rather than argue
about which oversimplification [about litigation] is more inaccurate, we should recog-
nize that modem litigation involves a broad spectrum of different kinds of disputes,
and therefore that we need a variety of different processes."); Zellar, supra note 18, at
866.
40 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good,
8J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979).
41 See Zellar, supra note 18, at 866 ("Private and public interests coexist as sepa-
rate preferences in ourjurisprudence."). Even Article III of the United States Consti-
tution arguably reflects the public/private distinction in its "case or controversy"
requirement. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power Over Federal Court Jurisdic-
tion: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article 1, 1997 BYU L. R v. 847,
864-65 ("The federal courts' principal function in Article III 'Cases' was to expound
laws having national and international significance, whereas their main role in 'Con-
troversies' was to act as an impartial arbitrator."); see also Pushaw, supra note 19.
42 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
43 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S.
27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Judicial precedents are presumptively correct
and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the property of
private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the public interest
would be served by vacatur."); Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4
Soc. PFUt. & POL'Y 102, 114-19 (1986); Henry E. Klingeman, Settlement PendingAppeal
An Argument for Vacatur, 58 FoRDHAm L. REv. 233, 234 (1989) ("The decision to grant
or to deny vacatur implicates private and public interests that sometimes conflict.");
Patrick E. Longan, Congress, the Courts, and the Long Range Plan, 46 Am. U. L. REv. 625,
662 (1997) ("Without question, the government should subsidize litigation to some
extent because private litigants create precedent that enables other litigants to resolve
or avoid disputes; thus, that precedent has public value."); David Luban, Settlements
and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEo. L.J. 2619, 2622 (1995) ("[S]ettlements, like
private adjudications, produce no rules or precedents binding on nonparties.").
45 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976); Luban, supra note 44, at 2623 ("The
Landes/Posner/Coleman/Silver analysis shows that precedents and legal rules are
public goods. Although the original litigants of the cases "purchase" the rules, future
litigants use these rules without paying.").
46 Sarokin, supra note 1, at 433. A court's decision in a case can also bind a non-
party, in appropriate circumstances, through res judicata or collateral estoppel. See
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (conditionally approving offensive
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resolution view of litigation predominates, perhaps because, as dis-
cussed above, it accords both with the viewpoint of litigation parties
and with current justiciability doctrine.
B. Bringing Precedent into the Litigation Models
As discussed above, the dispute resolution model minimizes the
importance of precedent in developing litigation policy, by looking at
it as a sort of "side effect" of adjudicating a dispute between opposing
parties. That view gives less importance to precedent than it deserves
because precedent has real power in forming the content of the law.
This Section explores how the content of precedent is shaped by party
actions. First it explores the effect of the nonrandom nature of settle-
ment on precedent, and then it looks at the effect of path-depen-
dence on the substantive development of precedent.
1. How Settlement Affects the Content of Precedent
As discussed above, 47 precedent does not just "happen." There
are two primary factors in the development of precedent: which cases
go to trial and therefore result in case precedents, and what the sub-
stantive decisions were in prior cases. If settlements occurred ran-
domly, the substantive content of precedent would not be affected by
settlements, even if ninety percent of cases were to settle. But settle-
ments are not random because trials are not random.48 As explained
below,49 economic analysis of litigation reveals that, where parties act
in accordance with the incentive to minimize costs, trials will occur
because of party estimation errors or bargaining failures. These trials,
nonrandomly selected from the underlying group of cases, will in turn
result in nonrandom precedent.
a. Economic Models of Suit and Settlement
Economic models of settlement assume that the parties derive a
settlement amount from the likely amount the court will award if the
use of nonmutual collateral estoppel); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav.
Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892, 898 (Cal. 1942) ("There is no compelling reason, however, for
requiring that the party asserting the plea of resjudicata must have been a party, or in
privity with a party, to the earlier litigation.").
47 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
48 See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go To Trial? An Empirical Study of Predictors
of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. Rxs. L. REV. 315 (1999); see also infra notes 49-63 and
accompanying text (explaining why trials are not random).
49 See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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case is tried.50 In other words, if the two parties to a case were to
agree, for example, that after trial the court will definitely award the
plaintiff $20,000, but it will cost each side $4000 to bring the case to
trial, then the parties could save time and money by settling for some-
where between $16,000 (what the plaintiff would net from trial) and
$24,000 (what the defendant would spend in damages plus litigation
costs). This simple example illustrates the general principle that
where the parties agree on the likely trial outcome, the aggregate of
their litigation costs (here $8000) creates the settlement "surplus" that
constitutes the parties' settlement range. 5 '
Scholars recognize that this basic economic model of settlement
unrealistically assumes, implicitly or explicitly, that the parties have
the same estimate of the likely outcome at trial,52 are risk-neutral,53 do
not engage in strategic behavior in dividing the settlement surplus,5 4
50 See Shavell, supra note 31.
51 The basic economic model assumes damages are stipulated and only liability is
in dispute. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litiga-
tion, 13J. LECAL STuD. 1 (1984). Even if the parties estimate that the plaintiff has less
than a 100% likelihood of being awarded the stipulated damages of $20,000, if they
agree that damages are $20,000, and on the estimated likelihood that those damages
will be found by the court, they will still have a settlement range equal to the aggre-
gate of their litigation costs. For example, if the parties agree that the plaintiff has a
70% likelihood of being awarded $20,000, then the statistically expected outcome at
trial is $14,000. If each party would spend $4000 to go to trial, the settlement range is
$10,000 to $18,000. This assumes that the parties are risk-neutral. See infra note 53.
52 See Gross & Syverud, supra note 4, at 324 ("[I]f plaintiffs and defendants always
agreed in their predictions of trial outcomes, there would be no trials at all.").
53 "Risk-neutral" parties are indifferent between a guaranteed amount, such as a
$14,000 settlement, and its equivalent expected value, such as a 70% probability of
receiving a $20,000 award at trial. SeeJeffirey M. Perloff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Settle-
ments in Private Antitrust Litigation, in PRivATE ANIRusT LmTIGATION 149, 152 (Law-
renceJ. White ed., 1988) ("Risk neutral individuals or firms make decisions solely on
the basis of the expected return associated with their actions .. ").
54 Strategic behavior is posturing by a party to capture more of the surplus cre-
ated by the settlement range. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 4, at 328; Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 6. For example, in the example discussed above, see supra text
accompanying notes 50-51, the plaintiff was willing to settle for anything over
$16,000. For strategic purposes, however, he might maintain that he will not settle for
anything less than $18,000. If the defendant also behaves strategically, perhaps pro-
testing that he would not pay more than $15,000, the parties might fai to settle de-
spite the existence of a genuine settlement range between $16,000 and $24,000. The
model also ignores the effects of attorneys, see RonaldJ. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin,
Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lauyers in Litigation, 94
CoLum. L. REv. 509, 512 (1994), and the externalities of court opinions in a prece-
dent-based system, see Bruce H. Kobayashi, Case Selection, External Effects, and the Trial/
Settlement Decision, in DIsPTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE S rrLFasurTr GAP 17 (DA
Anderson ed., 1996) (explaining that trials may occur because the effect of current
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and have no stakes in the litigation other than the economic outcome
of the particular case. 55 It also assumes that settlement costs are
zero, 56 or at least that litigation costs exceed settlement costs by the
hypothesized amount, $4000 in the example.5 7 If all of these assump-
tions were in fact true, and if parties made decisions based solely on
monetary factors, then the model would predict, unrealistically, that
no cases would ever go to trial. Everyone would negotiate a settlement
in the range created by the aggregate savings of avoiding trial. As up
to ten percent of cases do go to trial,58 the strict assumptions of the
basic model clearly do not hold true.
This basic economic model therefore serves as a mere starting
point to explain why some cases go to trial and others do not. Not
surprisingly, scholars have generally explained trials as deviations
from the unrealistically strict assumptions of the basic economic
model. "Optimism" and "asymmetric information" models each ex-
amine the effect of a particular type of deviation from the key assump-
tion of the model that the parties' estimates of the likely outcome at
trial are the same.59 Trials can also result from deviations from the
other assumptions, such as the assumption that parties do not behave
strategically in negotiating division of the settlement "surplus." 60 All
litigation on future litigation may eliminate a settlement range); Robert D. Cooter &
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27J. ECON.
LIT. 1067, 1070 (1989).
55 If a party has reputational stakes in the litigation or is concerned about the
precedential effect of a court decision, he will not be motivated by the pure economic
concerns of the single litigation. See Kobayashi, supra note 54; Priest & Klein, supra
note 51; see also Frank B. Gross, The Precedent-Setting Value of Litigation and the Selection of
Cases for Trial (unpublished paper on file with the author).
56 See Shavell, supra note 31, at 10 ("Trial is assumed to involve a cost for each
side, but for simplicity, settlement is taken to be costless.").
57 See Lederman, supra note 48.
58 See supra note 1.
59 See Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litiga-
tion, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1993) (describing a model in which divergent expecta-
tions about trial outcomes are based on asymmetric information, suggesting that the
"easy" cases go to trial because a party with private information will be eager to settle
cases in which he has a weaker than average case); Priest & Klein, supra note 51 (using
a model in which parties' estimates of trial outcome differ because of self-serving "op-
timism" bias to demonstrate that, if the other assumptions of the basic model remain
the same, the "close" cases will disproportionally go to trial).
60 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Perloff et al., Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes, 78 REv.
ECON. & STAT. 401, 402 (1996).
Failure to settle may occur for at least three reasons. First, the plaintiff's
expected gains may outweigh the defendant's expected losses either because
the plaintiff believes its probability of winning is greater than does the de-
fendant, or because the plaintiff expects a larger award at trial than does the
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of these reasons for trials suggest that trials result from some kind of
party failure in the bargaining process. 61
Allowing deviation from the basic model's assumption that the
parties' stakes are only those of the particular litigation allows recogni-
tion of the role of precedent in explaining trials. If a party to the
litigation is concerned about the effect on him of a precedent result-
ing from the litigation, that party will factor in the expected positive
or negative value of the precedent in deciding whether to settle the
case.6 2 In other words, if a precedent would save an estimated $8000
for the defendant in expected future litigation costs (after factoring in
the likelihood that the precedent will be favorable), then the defend-
ant values the potential payout at trial net of the $8000 savings, in-
creasing the likelihood of a trial.63 Conversely, if avoiding a
precedent is worth $2000 to a plaintiff, the plaintiff will be willing to
accept $2000 less in settlement, somewhat decreasing the likelihood
of trial.64
defendant. Second, one or both parties might enjoy taking risks, or their
lawyers may have a financial interest in the hours generated by a trial.
Third . . . "breakdowns" of the settlement bargaining process may occur
when parties have informational asymmetries ....
Id. Risk-seeking behavior can also increase the likelihood of trial. Risk aversion in-
creases the likelihood of settlement because a risk-averse party will prefer a sure out-
come, such as a $12,000 payment, even if it is less than the statistically predicted (but
uncertain) award at trial, such as a 70% likelihood of a $20,000 award (accompanied
by a 30% likelihood of no award at all). Of course the "framing" of options as "wins"
or "losses" may affect choices. SeeJeffrey Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psycholog of
Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 113 (1996).
61 See Gross & Syverud, supra note 4, at 320 ("A trial is a failure.").
62 See Kobayashi, supra note 54.
63 In the example used above, if the defendant expects a 70% likelihood of a
$20,000 payment, plus $4000 in litigation costs, but will benefit from the precedent by
$8000, then the defendant's expected cost of trial changes from $18,000 ($14,000
plus $4000) to $10,000 ($14,000 plus $4000 minus $8000). This will decrease the
defendant's maximum offer from $18,000 to $10,000, reducing the likelihood of
settlement.
64 That is, using the same example, if the plaintiff expected to net $10,000 follow-
ing trial ($14,000 expected award minus $4000 in litigation costs) but values a prece-
dent as a $2000 cost, the plaintiff's minimum demand will decrease from $10,000 to
$8000. Thus, the basic economic model reveals that, where precedent is not an issue,
trials result from bargaining failures of some kind that result in elimination of a settle-
ment range. Where trial results because of a party's desire for precedent, however,
this analysis suggests that trial is not a failure but rather a purposeful attempt to direct
the evolution of the law. See Kobayashi, supra note 54; Paul H. Rubin, Why is the
Common Law Efficient?, 6J. LEGAL STuD. 51, 54 (1977).
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b. The Economic Models' Predicted Effects on Precedent
Economic theories of suit and settlement each predict a certain
selection of cases for trial depending on the explanation for why cases
might fail to settle.6 5 For example, Priest and Klein's model, which
bases trials on estimation errors caused by party optimism, and adds
further assumptions about party estimation errors,6 6 indicates that the
"close" cases go to trial. 67 Priest and Klein's model therefore further
implies that the plaintiff will win fifty percent of trials.68 However, the
model's assumptions are too unrealistic to provide much insight into
the content of the resulting decisional precedents. If anything, what
decisions under Priest & Klein's model would do is make clear to the
litigants where the "decision standard" that separates the liability zone
from the non-liability zone lies. 69
Priest and Klein also suggest that where there are asymmetric
stakes (such as where one party has a greater interest in precedent
than the other), trial victory is more likely for the party with the
greater stakes.70 In general, this means precedents will tend to favor
repeat litigants such as institutional defendants. 7 1
Similarly, a model that focuses on the importance of precedent to
repeat litigants suggests that cases that favor the repeat litigant will be
65 See infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
66 The model assumes that the parties' estimation errors are random, independ-
ent of each other, normally distributed, with a mean of zero, and homoskedastic-
that is, that estimation error does not vary according to how close the case is to the
decision standard. See Kobayashi, supra note 54; Lederman, supra note 48.
67 See Priest & Klein, supra note 51 (noting that cases closest to the "decision
standard" in the case go to trial).
68 See id. Priest and Klein assume that damages are stipulated, so the only possi-
ble outcome is victory for plaintiff or victory for defendant. See id. at 17. The reason
for the "50% implication" is that under Priest and Klein's assumptions, the cases that
go to trial will disproportionately be those closest to the "decision standard" in the
case because the parties' estimation errors will be greater in those cases. See id Be-
cause this means that trials are equally distributed around the decision standard, the
judge will find for the plaintiff 50% of the time.
69 In Priest & Klein's basic model, damages are stipulated and there are only two
possible trial outcomes, liability and non-liability. See id. A particular dispute might
have any degree of liability-indicative facts. The "decision standard" is the rule divid-
ing those cases in which the decisionmaker will find the defendant liable from those
cases in which he will not. It is therefore implicit in Priest and Klein's model that the
decisionmaker will always accurately determine on which side of the decision stan-
dard a particular dispute lies. In other words, decisionmaker error is already factored
into the location of the decision standard. See Lederman, supra note 48.
70 See Priest & Klein, supra note 51, at 25.
71 These defendants are less likely to be willing to settle promising cases and
more willing to settle cases that look like losers.
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more likely to go to trial.72 This suggests that trial precedents are
more likely where a repeat player is a party and that such decisions are
more likely to favor the repeat player.73
Asymmetric information models, by contrast, suggest that the
"dear" cases will go to trial, because if a party with private information
has information damaging to his case, he will be more willing to settle,
thus increasing the settlement range.7 4 This view suggests that cases at
the tails of the distribution go to trial and that outcomes will favor the
party with the informational advantage. 75 However, outcomes will
move towards less extreme results over time, as error rates fall.7 6
The importance of each of these models to the analysis of the
development of precedent is that they suggest that litigation parties,
when left to their own devices, will settle cases nonrandomly, which in
72 See Kobayashi, supra note 54.
73 This model opposes the theory that the common law is "efficient," see, e.g.,
Gregory S. Crespi, The Adequate Assurances Doctrine After U. C. C. §2-609: A Test of the
Efficiency of the Common Law, 38 V.L. L. REv. 179, 179 n.1 (1993), that is, that case law
evolves toward legal rules that "maximize the aggregate wealth" of parties affected by
those rules, see id. at 179 n.1 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw
§ 1.2, 12-14 (3d ed. 1986), and Rubin, supra note 64). In the model it is applied to,
the current liability rule requires a particular party (such as the defendant) to bear
the costs of avoidance and future liability. If the suit is litigated and the plaintiff wins,
the liability rule remains the same, so avoidance and liability costs are unchanged.
On the other hand, if the defendant wins, the liability rule will be reversed, so that the
defendant no longer bears those costs, and the plaintiff must bear them. Under the
model, the process will continue, if both sides have a substantial interest in prece-
dents, until the liability rule is on the low-cost avoider, who will find it less expensive
to avoid liability than to litigate. Thus, cases that go to trial will disproportionately be
those where the law inefficiently places liability on the high-cost avoider.
If the model is correct in predicting which cases will go to trial, and if there is a
positive probability that inefficient liability rules will be reversed at trial, this model
implies that the law will evolve towards efficiency over time. The evolution towards
efficiency implication has been questioned by some scholars. See, e.g., Robert Cooter
& Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve Without the Help ofJudges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
139, 153-54 (1980) (arguing that such factors as strategic bargaining can cause cases
to go to trial whether the resulting precedent is efficient or inefficient); Cooter &
Rubinfeld, supra note 54 (explaining that economic models of legal change demon-
strated only a weak tendency towards efficiency); Georg van Wangenheim, The Evolu-
tion ofJudge Made Law, 13 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 381, 382-83 (1993) (arguing that
Public Choice theory must be considered in hypothesizing which legal rules are chal-
lenged in the judicial process).
74 SeeJames D. Miller, Using Lotteries to Expand the Range of Litigation Settlements, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 72 (1997).
75 See Hylton, supra note 59, at 199.
76 See id.
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turn will influence the substantive content of cases.77 At each step
along the way, therefore, from docketing through appeal, substantive
outcome will in part be determined by nonrandom party choices.
Thus, parties' settlement behavior will influence the substantive con-
tent of precedent.
2. The Effect of Path-Dependence on the Development of
Precedent
In a precedent-based system, cases are influenced by those cases
that were decided earlier.78 That is, our legal system adheres to the
concept of stare decisis, standing by things decided. For example, if a
precedent is established in Case A, and Case B is a similar case that is
heard subsequently by the same court or a lower court, Case B will be
governed by the holding of Case A.79 The outcome in Case B might
be different if it is decided after Case A exists as a governing prece-
dent than if Case B were decided first, because Case B might be de-
cided by a judge with different leanings on the issue than the judge
who decided Case A. Thus, if Case A is decided by Judge X establish-
ing a principle that applies to Case B, which later comes before Judge
Yon the same court, then Judge Ywill likely feel compelled by stare
decisis to rule the same way Judge X did-although Judge Y might
have ruled the opposite way had he had the opportunity to decide
Case B before Judge X had decided Case A.80 Precedent is therefore
"path-dependent": the order in which cases are presented to a court
for decision can influence the substantive content of precedent.
Path-dependence of case law is not limited to courts in which dif-
ferent judges decide different cases. Substantive outcome can be in-
fluenced by the ordering of cases even on a court such as the Supreme
Court, where the same Justices decide all of the cases.81 That is, if the
77 See Theodore Eisenberg, The Relationship Between Plaintiff Success Rates Before
Trial and at Trial, 154J. ROYAL STAT. Soc'Y 111, 111 (1991). ("For example, if tried
cases contain equal victories for plaintiffs and defendants, one cannot conclude that
the applicable legal rules are even-handed. Even if the rules heavily favour the plain-
tiff, the similar trial success rates are consistent with there being many cases in which
plaintiffs recover without going to trial.").
78 Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REv. 817, 818 & n.2 (1994). Stare decisis may be accepted by judges because
each judge, though preferring to impose his own views, also wants his own decisions
to be followed by other judges. See Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or implicit Collusion?:
Toward a Came Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 736 (1993).
79 See Caminker, supra note 78, at 818 & n.2.
80 See O'Hara, supra note 78.
81 This ignores changes in the composition of the Court that occur over time; a
change in the composition of the bench increases path-dependence.
[V€OL. 75:1
PRECEDENT LOST
concept of stare decisis did not exist, the Supreme Court could con-
sider each case anew, which could result in cycling of decisions over
time.8 2 Stare decisis prevents that cycling, but at the price of render-
ing later decisions outcome-dependent on earlier ones.8 3 Precedent
is therefore path-dependent regardless of who decides the cases. As
discussed below, path-dependence raises the opportunity for inten-
tional path-manipulation targeted to influencing the content of a
body of precedent.
II. TmRD-PARTY INVOLVEMENT rN LrrIGATIoN AND SETTEMENT
The basic litigation scenario discussed above assumes that the
parties control the litigation without the influence of third parties.
However, third parties sometimes do become involved in creating or
preventing precedents. The path-dependence of precedent creates an
opportunity for influence on precedent through manipulation of
which cases are presented to a court and the order in which they are
presented.
This Part first considers Article Ill courts, in which path-depen-
dence is somewhat mitigated by justiciability doctrine. It examines
how interest groups can manipulate the evolution of precedent in Ar-
ticle II courts in spite of justiciability doctrine. In part, it considers
Piscataway Township Board of Education v. Taxman,84 in which an inter-
est group manipulated Supreme Court precedent by engineering a
settlement of the case. This Part then considers Article I courts, in
which justiciability doctrine plays no constitutional role. That discus-
sion focuses on Smith v. Commissioner,8 5 a tax shelter case in which a
third-party attempt to engineer a settlement was unsuccessful because
the court rejected one party's attempt to concede the case in full, re-
quiring the parties to continue litigating.
82 See Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1309, 1349 & n.121 (1995).
83 See id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM.
BAN'R. L.J. 109, 128 (1997) ("Principles of stare dedsis serve many valuable ends. First,
they enhance efficiency. If appellate precedents are followed, there is no need to
litigate the same issue repeatedly in different cases. The question is decided in an
appellate court, and lower courts are then responsible for following that decision.").
84 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
85 78 T.G. 350 (1982), affd, 820 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1987).
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A. Article III Courts
Most federal courts are Article III courts, that is, courts that exer-
cise the 'judicial Power of the United States" under Article 111.86 Arti-
cle III courts include the District Courts, Courts of Appeals, and the
Supreme Court. The Constitution restricts Article III courts' jurisdic-
tion to cases and controversies.8 7
1. Justiciability as a Limitation on Precedent Manipulation
Absent certain narrow exceptions, Article III courts will not de-
cide "non-justiciable" cases."" The bar on deciding non-justiciable
cases is derived from Article III's "cases or controversies" clause.8 9
Under the rubric of non-justiciable cases,90 these courts will not de-
cide cases that are unripe, 91 cases in which the plaintiff does not have
86 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982).
87 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
88 An important exception is otherwise "moot" cases that are "capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review." Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969) (quoting South-
em Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), is a well-known example of such a case.
89 See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988) ("Under Article III of the
Constitution this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.") (citing
Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976)); United States Parole
Comm'n. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404 (1980); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401
(1975); cf Honig, 484 U.S. at 331 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("The logical conclu-
sion to be drawn from these cases, and from the historical development of the princi-
ple of mootness, is that while an unwillingness to decide moot cases may be
connected to the case or controversy requirement of Art. III, it is an attenuated con-
nection that may be overridden where there are strong reasons to override it."). The
rationales for mootness doctrine include ensuring adversarial presentation of issues,
judicial economy, avoidance of unnecessary litigation, and avoidance of ill-considered
opinions based on a poor factual record. See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Cas4 42
STAN. L. REV. 227, 245 (1990); see also Note, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83
HARv. L. REV. 1672, 1675 (1970) [hereinafter Mootness] ("Courts [do] not 'waste'
their time passing on the merits of 'nondisputes'-controversies for which there is no
judicial remedy.") But cf. Bandes, supra at 245 ("[T]o the extent a case is a device to
prevent the Court from squandering its resources on nonjudicial tasks, the mootness
doctrine presents quite a paradox. As ChiefJustice Rehnquist recently observed, the
Court's 'unique resources.., are squandered in every case in which it becomes appar-
ent after the decisional process is underway that we may not reach the question
presented.'") (quoting Honig, 484 U.S. at 332 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).
90 Cases that involve political questions are also non-justiciable. See, e.g., Lea
Brilmayer, TheJurisprudence of Article II: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Require-
ment, 93 HARv. L. REV. 297 (1979); Chemerinsky, supra note 83, at 117.
91 A case is not "ripe" if its resolution is legally premature.
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standing,92 and cases that have become moot93-and such courts will
not issue "advisory opinions."94
Justiciability doctrine therefore requires an actual injury to the
plaintiff, which has matured and which has not been mooted by subse-
quent events. In fact, all of these limitations are restrictions on the
timing of when a court can hear a case. That is, although justiciability
doctrine may be applied to preclude a court from hearing a particular
case at all, the court may subsequently hear a different case on the
same issue. Limiting litigation to 'Justiciable" disputes provides a cer-
tain randomness in that it cannot easily be influenced by interested
92 "Standing" doctrine requires a plaintiff to have a legally cognizable interest in a
lawsuit to bring a claim.
93 Mootness doctrine requires a continuing interest in resolution of the lawsuit in
order for the court to decide the case. Mootness is "the doctrine of standing set in a
time frame." Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 397 (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)).
The Supreme Court has stated that a case is moot when either there is no longer
a "live" controversy or the "parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome."
Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 396 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).
Because a "live" controversy is required, a case can be mooted by settlement, aban-
donment by the plaintiff of his claim, or by full concession by the defendant. See, e.g.,
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 20, 21-22
(1994) ("The parties agreed that confirmation of the plan constituted a settlement
that mooted the case.... If a judgment has become moot [while awaiting review],
this Court may not consider its merits, but may make such disposition of the whole
case as justice may require.") (quoting Wailing v.James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671,
677 (1944)); Lake Coal Co. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 474 U.S. 120 (1985); Deposit
Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980) ("A case or controversy is mooted
in the Art. III sense upon payment and satisfaction of a final, unappealable judgment
... ."); California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308 (1893) (holding that
the railroad's offer to pay the State the amounts at issue and deposit of the money in a
bank mooted the case); Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 866 F.2d 1391, 1392 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (stating that "settlement moots an action"); Tosco Corp. v. Hodel, 826 F.2d
948, 948 (10th Cir. 1987); Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1968) (dis-
missing appeal as moot where government tendered full amount sought to be re-
funded and court was satisfied issue would not recur for subsequent year).
94 See, e.g., Muskratv. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); Mootness, supra note 89,
at 1673 (footnote omitted) ("The prohibition against rendering advisory opinions
may be stimulated by the total lack of a factual record, as when a coordinate branch of
government makes a request for judicial advice."). But cf Bandes, supra note 89, at
245 ("This confusion, evident throughout the literature ofjusticiability, is thrown into
sharp relief in the mootness context, in which concrete adverseness once existed, but
no longer does. Depending on the stage of the proceedings, concrete factual devel-
opment continues to be available to assist the Court, and to some degree, adversity
continues as well, since at least one of the parties is still willing to litigate.") (citing
13A CHARLES ALAN W1mUGs ET AL., FEDERAL PRAcTcE AND PRocEDURE § 3533.1, at 218
(1984)).
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parties. 95 Thus, justiciability doctrine ameliorates path manipulation
by interest groups that could affect the substantive development of the
law96 by imposing on cases timing limitations that are not entirely
within the control of the interested party.
Current justiciability doctrine requires that a case be dismissed if it
is nonjusticiable, even if the justiciability problem arises during the
pendency of the litigation.97 For example, if a case becomes moot, it
is dismissed even if the case is nearly ready to be tried. This is not the
only possible approach to justiciability doctrine, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist views mootness doctrine as nonmandatory, merely guided by Ar-
ticle 111.98 In this view, the Court would have discretion to require
parties to litigate a case that had become moot.
2. Interest-Group Ability to Engineer a Precedent in Article III
Courts Despite Justiciability Doctrine
As discussed above, justiciability doctrine precludes a party desir-
ous of a precedent in a particular area from simply obtaining an advi-
sory opinion or suing in advance of actual injury.99 In particular, the
requirement that a plaintiff must have standing to sue 0 0 helps pre-
vent doctrinal manipulation by interest groups desiring a precedent 0 1
because such groups cannot bring suit without having sustained a con-
crete injury.10 2 Nevertheless, that does not mean that suits are insti-
tuted randomly or even haphazardly by injured parties. Although it
was not always the case,1 03 interest groups currently have the remedy
95 See Steams, supra note 82, at 1351, 1359 (discussing standing).
96 See id. at 1351.
97 See supra note 89.
98 See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
99 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
100 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972).
102 See supra text accompanying note 99.
103 See Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 43, 52 ("[Tlhe common law built barriers between the client and the lawyer.
Each of these barriers sought to assure that the client would initiate and finance litiga-
tion so he would be neither a free nor a kidnapped rider. The law of barratry forbade
the stirring up of quarrels, including the filing of a suit, however meritorious, without
the plaintiffs permission. Champerty consisted of agreeing to divide the spoils of a
lawsuit, thereby financing litigation that would not otherwise occur. Maintenance
consisted of financing another's suit, a form of private legal aid."). Modem law has
moved away from prohibitions on barratry, champerty, and maintenance. Modem
law allows contingent-fee agreements, which would have been prohibited under
champerty rules. See id. at 54. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), however, the
Supreme Court held barratry and maintenance prohibitions unconstitutional as ap-
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of seeking out a party who was actually injured and conducting and
financing the litigation. 10 4 "Test" cases are not considered collusive so
long as there was an actual injury to the plaintiff.10 5 This strategy can
affect the outcome of the case, in part because the test case can be
chosen on the basis of particularly favorable facts.' 06 In addition, in-
terest groups can influence the order that cases reach the Supreme
Court,10 7 which, as discussed above, can affect case outcomes.10 8
Justice Thurgood Marshall's approach on behalf of the NAACP to
obtaining victory in Brown v. Board ofEducation,10 9 which overruled the
"separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,110 is an excellent
example of such a successful strategy.'1 ' Rather than attacking Plessy
directly, Justice Marshall executed a well-planned series of steps
designed to chip away incrementally at the "separate but equal" rule
plied to the NAACP, finding the NAACP litigation a form of political expression. See
id. at 429-31. The case involved the Virginia Conference of the NAACP, which fo-
cused on "financing litigation aimed at ending racial segregation" in Virginia public
schools. Id. at 420 & n.4. The Virginia Conference generally financed cases in which
the plaintiff retained an NAACP staff attorney, but sometimes financed other cases.
See id.
104 SeeJohn Howard, Retaliation, Reinstatement, and Friends of the Court: Amicus Par-
ticipation in Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 31 How. LJ. 241, 254 (1988) ("Litigation
is not an uncommon interest group tactic. Most notable for handling cases from trial
through the appellate level are groups such as the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU). These organizations identify potential abuses and orchestrate implementa-
tion of their goals through carefully-managed test cases, becoming, in effect, the real
party in interest.").
105 See Button, 371 U.S. at 429-31 (1963); see also supra note 101; cf Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (holding that a black "tester," an employee of
Housing Opportunities Made Equal, who was given false information about housing
availability, had standing to challenge racial steering under section 812 of the Fair
Housing Act because section 804(d) of that Act made misrepresentation as to the
availability of a dwelling unlawful).
106 See Gerald L. Neuman, Variations forMixed Voices, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1851, 1866
n.61 (1989) (reviewing Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE AS POLICAL PRo-
CESs (1988)) ("The direction of doctrinal development in a system that includes a
norm of precedent is substantially path-dependent. Lawyers attempt to exploit this
characteristic in their strategic choice of plaintiffs and defendants .... .").
107 Nat Hentoff, Victim of Affirmative Action, VILLAGE VoIcE, Jan. 6, 1998, at 20
("Thurgood Marshall prepared his cases very carefully, structuring a dynamic of
lower-court cases so that when he got to the Supreme Court with Brown v. Board of
Education, the door was open."). Justice Marshall's strategy is discussed in further
detail below. See infra notes 110-21 and accompanying text.
108 See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
109 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
111 See Stearns, supra note 82, at 1364-66.
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Of P/essy.112 The NAACP started at the graduate school level, where
the challenge was least likely to be opposed by whites and most likely
to be successful. 113 The first case the NAACP brought to implement
this strategy was Pearson v. Murray,1 4 involving a challenge from a
black man who had been denied admission to Maryland Law
School. 115 The NAACP found "an ideal [plaintiff]-... a twenty-year-
old Baltimore resident who had graduated from Amherst . . .- [a]
well-qualified, nice-looking fellow from a prominent black family."116
Having achieved victory at the appellate level, the NAACP brought
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada1 7 to the Supreme Court. In that case,
the Court ordered the State of Missouri to either admit blacks to the
existing white law school or to provide an in-state law school for
blacks; this was the NAACP's first major Supreme Court victory." 8 It
was followed by NAACP victories in Sipuel v. Board of Regents,119 Sweatt
v. Painter,120 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents.121 These suc-
cesses set the stage for the NAACP's important victory in Brown v.
Board of Education122 in 1954, which required integration of elemen-
tary schools. Without the earlier favorable precedents, the Brown re-
sult would likely not have been possible.' 23
The ACLU and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg followed a similar
strategy in seeking heightened scrutiny protection for women under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 After
winning Reed v. Reed,125
112 See id.
113 See id. at 1365 n.165.
114 182 A. 590 (Md. 1936).
115 See Steams, supra note 82, at 1365 n.166.
116 RIcHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HIsTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCA-
TION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALrrv 187 (1975).
117 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
118 Daniel Gyebi, A Tribute to Courage on the Fortieth Anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education, 38 How. L.J. 23, 34 & n.60 (1994).
119 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (requiring Oklahoma to provide an equal law school edu-
cation to a woman denied admission to the University of Oklahoma because she was
black).
120 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (requiring admission of qualified blacks to the University
of Texas Law School).
121 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (prohibiting the University of Oklahoma from requiring a
black graduate student to sit physically separated in the classroom, to use separate
tables outside the library, and to eat at separate times in the school cafeteria).
122 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
123 See Stearns, supra note 82, at 1366.
124 See id.
125 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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the AGLU established the Women's Rights Project, and Ginsburg
became its first director. In this role, her strategy in bringing cases
to the Supreme Court had several components. First, she pursued
an incremental approach, whereupon she would build "precedents
one upon the other." Similarly, she chose cases with easily under-
standable issues that could be clearly won "which would lay the
precedential groundwork for more difficult problems."1 26
The strategy of picking cases with favorable facts and sympathetic
plaintiffs explains how interest groups can rely on the path-depen-
dence of precedent to influence the development of the law despite
standing doctrine. In effect, interest groups can weight both the pool
of docketed cases by picking cases with favorable facts and the pool of
which cases go to trial by being unwilling to settle these favorable
cases. That is, neither Justice Marshall nor Justice Ginsburg sought
"dispute resolution" in the traditional sense, 27 but rather they sought
helpful precedents to further their causes. The interests of the nomi-
nal plaintiffs in the cases they litigated were not the motivation; in-
stead the motivation was the interests of the larger group to which the
plaintiffs belonged. 128 Thus, despite the restrictions of the jus-
ticiability doctrine discussed in Section B, interest groups desirous of
precedents can bring cases to court for the express purpose of prece-
dent creation. These cases are unlikely to settle because, in the lan-
guage of the economic model discussed in Part I, Section A, 129 the
parties have such unequal stakes that a settlement range does not ex-
ist. That is, the interest group is unlikely to settle regardless of any
offer made by the defendant because its goal is to obtain a favorable
precedent.
3. Interest-Group Ability to Avoid Precedent by Engineering a
Settlement
Interest groups do not influence the substantive content of prece-
dent only by selecting specific cases to litigate. Although less com-
mon, interest groups can also help settle cases they believe would
result in precedent harmful to their cause. 130 Piscataway Township
126 Joyce Ann Baugh et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Preliminary Assessment 26
U. ToL L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1994) (quoting Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality:
One Woman's Work to Change the Law, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 73, 75, 83, 97 (1989)).
127 See supra text accompanying note 9.
128 See supra notes 107-26 and accompanying text. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963), permits this kind of litigation. See supra note 103.
129 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
130 Another technique that has been widely discussed is settlement pending ap-
peal contingent on a joint motion for vacatur of a lower court's decision. See, e.g.,
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Board of Education v. Taxman'3' is a well-known and controversial ex-
ample of an interest group "engineering" a settlement.
a. The Piscataway Story
The Piscataway case arose out of a layoff in Piscataway, NewJersey.
The Piscataway School Board, faced with budget cuts, selected Sharon
Taxman for layoff.13 2 Ms. Taxman, who is white, and Debra Williams,
who is black, had commenced employment the same day and were the
most junior teachers in the department. 133 Because the two teachers
had equal seniority and they were determined to be of equal ability
and qualifications, 3 4 the school board needed a tiebreaker in deter-
Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective Publication, Depubli-
cation, and Vacatur, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 109, 136 n.173 (1995) ("While it is
impossible to know why a losing party would want to vacate a particular opinion, the
institutional litigant's likely motive was to erase negative precedent."). The scholarly
outcry appropriately reflects the view that precedents are public, and therefore not
subject to the parties' private agreement. See, e.g., Daniel Purcell, The Public Right to
Precedent: A Theory and Rejection of Vacatur, 85 CAL. L. REv. 867, 887 (1997) ("Vacatur
typically comes out of an agreement between the parties, hardly an adversary tactic.
Instead, the repeat player uses vacatur "against" the public in general, the larger body
of future possible litigants, by depriving them of favorable precedent on which to rely.
When vacatur is understood in this way-as a means of controlling future consequent-
ial damages resulting from an adverse finding-the adversary party in the current
litigation becomes irrelevant."); see also David M. Staker, Comment, The Use of Lower
Court Judgments as Bargaining Chips: Should Courts Routinely Grant Vacatur When Parties
Settle Pending Appeal?, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 233, 242 (1994) ("By converting the judg-
ment into a bargaining chip in the process of settlement, vacatur 'clouds and dimin-
ishes' the value of precedent.") (citation omitted). A detailed discussion of
settlement contingent on vacatur is beyond the scope of this Article.
131 521 U.S. 1117 (1997).
132 At the time of layoffs, each teacher had nine years of seniority in typing and
secretarial studies. See United States v. Board of Educ., 832 F. Supp. 836, 840 (D.N.J.
1993). With respect to general bookkeeping and accounting, Ms. Taxman had nine
years of seniority, and Ms. Williams had four years and three months of seniority. See
id.
133 SeeJan Crawford Greenburg, Civil Rights Groups Pay Teacher to Avoid Court, CHI.
TeRB., Nov. 22, 1997, § 1, at 1.
134 See Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1551 (3d Cir. 1996). Ms. Williams
had a masters degree, and Ms. Taxman did not, but the courts did not discuss the
relevance of the additional degree in the comparison of qualifications. See Yvonne
Scruggs-Leftwich, Not a Case of Affirmative Action, WASH. PosT, Dec. 13, 1997, at A21.
Ms. Taxman apparently had two more years of teaching experience than Ms. Williams
so the Piscataway School Board deemed their qualifications equal. See Paul Shepard,
Issue One That Isn't Going Away, CHArrANooGA TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at AS.
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mining whom to lay off. Normally, the school flipped a coin.135 In
this case, however, Piscataway used its affirmative action policy as a
tiebreaker. 136 Although blacks were not underrepresented in the
school as a whole,137 Ms. Williams was the only black teacher in the
department so Ms. Taxman was the one chosen for layoff.138
Ms. Taxman filed a charge of employment discrimination with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 3 9 When the case
was not resolved administratively, the United States sued the school
board under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,140 and Ms.
Taxman intervened, suing under both Title VII and the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination. 141 The district court granted partial sum-
mary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of the United States
and Ms. Taxman. 142
By the time of trial on the issue of damages, the school board had
reinstated Ms. Taxman. 14 The district court awarded Ms. Taxman
$134,014.62 for back pay, fringe benefits, and prejudgment interest
under Title VII, and the court ordered the school board to give Ms.
Taxman full seniority reflecting continuous employment from the
time she was originally hired.'4 Ajury awarded Ms. Taxman an addi-
tional $10,000 for emotional suffering under the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination. 145
The school board appealed, and Ms. Taxman cross-appealed on
the denial of her punitive damages claim. 146 In a nine to four deci-
sion, the Third Circuit found the school board liable. Importantly,
135 See Simon Barber, Settlement to Blow Affirmative Action, Bus. DAY (S. AFR.), Nov.
27, 1997, at 15 ("If they had both been of the same race, the board later conceded the
issue would have been decided by the toss of a coin.").
136 See id. The affirmative action policy had been adopted in 1983. See id.
137 See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1563.
138 See Board of Education, 832 F. Supp. at 840.
139 See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1552.
140 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1-e-17 (1994).
141 See Board of Education, 832 F. Supp. at 836.
142 See id. at 851.
143 See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1552.
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See id. On appeal, the United States was no longer a party to the case. See id.
As a result of a change in administrations, the Justice Department apparently changed
its substantive position in the case, arguing that Piscataway's approach was Constitu-
tional. See Russ Bleemer, Court Bars DOJfrom School Board Case, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 27,
1995, at 19; Russ Bleemer, Sloviter Will Be Tie-Breaker in Discrimination Case, N.J. LJ.,
Nov. 6, 1995, at 3. The Clinton administration then changed tacks, urging the
Supreme Court to rule narrowly in favor of Ms. Taxman. See Greenburg, supra note
133, at 1.
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the court stated, "Although we applaud the goal of racial diversity, we
cannot agree that Title VII permits an employer to advance that goal
through non-remedial discriminatory measures."147
The school board petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,
and the petition was granted.1 48 Civil rights groups feared that Piscat-
away could lead to a broad Supreme Court ruling that diversity is
never an acceptable motive for a racial preference. 149 The groups of-
fered the school board $300,000 towards a settlement with Ms.
Taxman, in order to avoid a potentially damaging Supreme Court de-
cision. Two months before the scheduled oral argument,' 50 the
school board settled with Ms. Taxman for $433,500.151 The board re-
ported that it settled the case to avoid publicity and because it thought
it was best for the town. 152 The board also stated that it had accepted
the $300,000 from civil rights groups to appease local taxpayers.153
147 Id. at 1567.
148 See Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997).
149 See Greenburg, supra note 133, at 1 ("'The fear is that the Supreme Court in
recent times has been rather hostile to affirmative action,' said Antonia Hernandez,
president and general counsel of Mexican American Legal and Educational Defense
Fund, or MALDEF, which supported the school board. 'The concern was this case
was going to be more of a vehicle for destroying what's left of affirmative action,
rather than dealing with the facts of the case and allowing civil rights lawyers to put
the best case forward.'") (citation ommitted); see also Hentoff, supra note 107, at 20
("[Debra Williams] was also abandoned, of course, by Jesse Jackson, Hugh Price of
the National Urban League, and Kweisi Mfume of the NAACP, among other members
of the Black Leadership Forum. They felt they had urgent responsibilities to blacks in
the mass because the Piscataway case looked like a sure loser. And the Supreme
Court could bring down many affirmative action gains in hiring and admissions
throughout the country."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Supreme Court Avoidance; On Piscat-
away, Strategy and the High Court, WASH. PosT, Dec. 7, 1997, at Cl.
150 Oral argument had been scheduled forJanuary 14, 1998. See Paula Alexander
Becker, Affirmative Action and Reverse Discrimination: Does Taxman v. Board of Educa-
tion of the Township of Piscataway Define the Outer Limits of Lawful Voluntary Race-
Conscious Affirmative Action, 8 SETON HALL CONST. LJ. 13, 15 n.14 (1997).
151 See Melissa Henneberger, On Race, an Optimist in an Unlikely Place, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1997, § 14, at 2. Of the settlement, Ms. Taxman received $186,000, which
reflects the $144,000 of back pay awarded by the district court plus interest, and her
lawyer received $247,500. See Linda Greenhouse, Affirmative Action Settlement: The
Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at Al.
152 See Abby Goodnough, Financial Details Are Revealed in Affirmative Action Settle-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1997, at Al [hereinafter Goodnough, Financial Details]; Abby
Goodnough, Why Piscataway Decided to Avoid Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1997, at B5
[hereinafter Goodnough, Avoid Spotlight].
153 See Goodnough, Avoid Spotlight, supra note 152, at B5. The Black Leadership
Forum, a group of the leaders of a dozen major civil rights groups including the
Urban League and the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, was the leader-
ship of the coalition. See Greenhouse, supra note 151, at Al.
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Because the parties to the case had reached a settlement, the
Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot 54 in accordance with the
"case or controversy" clause of Article M. 155
b. The Likely Effect of the Piscataway Settlement on the
Evolution of Affirmative Action Precedent
Piscataway is an example of the importance of path dependence
to the development of precedent. If Piscataway had not settled, it
would likely have created an important affirmative action precedent.
The Black Leadership Forum therefore viewed the Piscataway settle-
ment as a major victory:
On Nightline, Kweisi Nftune, delighted that the case had been
blocked from the Supreme Court, predicted that a bright new
formula has been found to achieve further civil rights victories:
"The real fact of the matter," Mfume said, "is that civil rights groups
have learned the tactics of the extreme right wing, have adjusted to
them, and have found a way to beat them at their own game. So
we're not running. We're getting smarter."156
However, although Piscataway did settle, other cases will likely
come through the pipeline to the Supreme Court. Why then did civil
rights groups strive to settle Piscataway? Civil rights leaders apparently
feared that the stark facts of Piscataway--two equally junior teachers,
one black, one white-would make for more unfavorable law than
other cases: 157
154 See Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997). But cf.
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330 (1988) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring) ("I... would go
still further in the direction of relaxing the test of mootness where the events giving
rise to the claim of mootness have occurred after our decision to grant certiorari or to
note probable jurisdiction.").
155 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
156 Hentoff, supra note 107, at 20.
157 See Roger Abrams, Diversity Defenders Await Post-Taxman Battles, NJ. LJ., Dec.
29, 1997, at 23 ("The Taxman case was a very poor vehicle to re-examine the constitu-
tionality of race-conscious decision making. Why? Because, by stipulation, race was
the only factor that distinguished the two candidates for purposes of deciding who
should be laid off. That, of course, could never be true and is never true, except in a
law school hypothetical, in a stipulated case such as this one or in the minds of advo-
cates who. pray for a return to the old days, when the old-white-boy network deter-
mined who would stay and who would go."); see also Barry Bearak, Rights Groups
Ducked a Fight, Opponents Say, N.Y. TnMEs, Nov. 22, 1997, at Al ("'There is an old adage
that bad cases make for bad law, and this was one of the worst cases imaginable for
defenders of affirmative action,' said Hugh B. Price, president of the National Urban
League, which is part of the leadership forum. 'This case has such a narrow set of
circumstances,' Mr. Price said, 'and the fear was that this case could spill over into
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African-Americans and other victims of race prejudice owe a deep
debt of gratitude to the Piscataway School Board and their attorney,
David Rubin, for settling the Piscataway affirmative action case.
Had the case not been settled, we would have witnessed the effective
end of affirmative action by summer's end.
The U.S. Supreme Court has chiseled away at the constitutional
foundation for affirmative action efforts since the 1980s. In light of
this political reality, this court might well have silenced all affirma-
tive action programs with a decision in this case.
By settling the case, the Piscataway School Board averted this
crisis.1 58
By settling Piscataway, civil rights leaders hoped that the case
from which the Supreme Court makes law will have facts more
favorable to their cause.1 59 In addition, it might be a while before
another "reverse discrimination" case is appealed to the Supreme
Court. 60 Settlement succeeded in altering not only which case would
be heard by the Court but also the timing of when such a case would
be heard and perhaps the order of such cases. 161 Depending on the
composition of the Court when the next case is heard, this strategy
may alter the substantive result in the case.1 62
Under the mootness jurisprudence discussed above, the Supreme
Court had no choice but to dismiss Piscataway once Ms. Taxman and
other factual situations. The Court has ruled that race can be used as one factor in
promoting diversity and you wouldn't want a wide ruling that changes that' ");John
Kolbe, Affirmative Action Backers Try to Buy Their Own Justice, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Nov. 30,
1997, at H5 ("Kweisi Mfume, director of the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People; defended the settlement on grounds that the Piscataway suit,
because of its special facts, was 'inappropriate' to use as a vehicle for judging affirma-
tive action.").
158 Winkfield F. Twyman, Doing the Right Thing: One Lauyer's Sacrifice, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Nov. 27, 1997, at B9.
159 See Abrams, supra note 157, at 23 ("Recently, the Center for Individual Rights,
the right-wing crowd of counter-revolutionary lawyers in Washington which has
spearheaded this attack, brought suit against the University of Michigan and then
separately against the University of Michigan Law School. Another suit against the
University of Washington is in its early stages. These cases, when they are tried, will
place the case for affirmative action in a more realistic framework than Taxman.").
160 See id. ("Although conservative groups had salivated at the prospect of winning
big in Taxman, they will have to wait for years to get another chance to kill off racial
equity. Eventually, the Supreme Court will hear the cases that will determine the
future of our commitment to diversity.").
161 See supra notes 106-23 and accompanying text.
162 Cf Stearns, supra note 82, at 1315.
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the school board entered into a settlement. 63 The fact that third par-
ties had provided funds toward the settlement was simply irrelevant to
the determination that Piscataway was no longer justiciable. Ironi-
cally, in the Piscataway context, justiciability doctrine facilitated inter-
est-group path-manipulation. Although most cases settle, 64 and
although cases have settled even after the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari, 65 the role of civil rights groups in the settlement caused an
outcry among many people about the inappropriateness of third-party
engineering of the evolution of the law.166 The merits of this outcry
are considered in Part III.B below.
B. Article I Courts and Precedent Manipulation
Unlike Article III courts, Article I courts are created by Congress
under its enumerated powers 67 coupled with its authority to make
laws "necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof."168 These courts generally are specialized courts such as the
Tax Court;169 lie outside of the fifty states, such as the Territorial
163 Nevertheless, ChiefJustice Rehnquist has argued that once the Supreme Court
has granted certiorari or noted probable jurisdiction, mootness doctrine should not
necessarily prohibit the Court from hearing the case if subsequent events have ren-
dered it moot. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 329-32 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
164 See supra note 1.
165 See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18,
20 (1994) ("After we granted the petition [for certiorari] ... and received briefing on
the merits, Bancorp and Bonner stipulated to a consensual plan of reorganization,
which received the approval of the Bankruptcy Court. The parties agreed that confir-
mation of the plan constituted a settlement that mooted the case.") (citation
omitted).
166 See Bearak, supra note 157, at Al ("They were ready to fight and the other guy
backed out, disappointed affirmative action opponents said yesterday, complaining
that the $433,500 settlement in the Piscataway, N.J. case amounted to hush money
paid by frightened civil rights groups."); Sullivan, supra note 149, at Cl ("When civil-
rights groups engineered a sudden settlement last month of a major affirmative ac-
tion case before the Supreme Court, mooting the case and preventing the court from
reaching any ruling, many professed to be shocked, shocked, that the court's docket
could be so manipulated.").
167 The Tax Court is established under Congress' power to "lay and collect taxes."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also I.R.C. § 7441 (1999).
168 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Admin-
istrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE LJ. 197, 198.
169 The Tax Court was established by Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7441, as amended by
Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 730 (1969).
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courts;170 and/or are involved in adjudicating "public rights,"' 71 that
is, cases in which the United States is a proper party. 172 Functionally,
Article I courts are subject to more limitations than Article III courts
because of the greater independence of the Article III judiciary.173
However, Article I courts are not constrained by the "case or contro-
versy" clause of Article III of the Constitution. Otherwise, Article I
courts and Article III courts evidence few differences. For example,
Tax Court and district court decisions are both reviewed by the courts
of appeals, Article III courts. 174 Both the Tax Court and the district
courts also follow applicable court of appeals precedent. 75 As in Arti-
cle III courts, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in Tax Court.' 76
170 See Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989). The territorial courts are those
in Guam, the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. See
56 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 11 (5th ed. 1994).
171 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67
n.18 (1982) ("Congress' power to create legislative courts to adjudicate public rights
carries with it the lesser power to create administrative agencies for the same purpose,
and to provide for review of those agency decisions in Art. III courts."). But see id. at
113 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T] here is no difference in principle between the work
that Congress may assign to an Art. I court and that which the Constitution assigns to
Art. III courts."); see also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18
U.S. (1 How.) 272, 284 (1856) ("At the same time there are matters, involving public
rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of
acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which con-
gress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States,
as it may deem proper.").
172 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70.
173 See Herbert C. Shelley et al., The Standard of Review Applied by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in International Trade and Customs Cases, 45 AM. U.
L. REv. 1749, 1826 n.427 (1996) ("Article III courts are structurally more independent
than their legislative counterparts (Article I courts) .... This is due to: (1) the life
tenure afforded Article III judges; (2) Article III courts not being connected to any
particular government agency; (3) Article III courts having their jurisdiction largely
defined by the Constitution; and (4) the limitation on reductions in salaries of active
Article IlIjudges. Due to this greater degree of independence, it is generally assumed
that the decisions of an Article III court are less likely to be affected by political agen-
das or the majority position of the populace on a given issue or at a particular time.").
174 See I.R.C. § 7482 (West Supp. 1999) (dealing with Tax Court); 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1994) (dealing with district courts).
175 See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970). However, the Tax Court's
jurisdiction is limited by statute, so it has no equity jurisdiction. Article I courts such
as the Tax Court also do not have jury trials.
176 See I.R.C. § 7453 (West Supp. 1999).
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1. The Smith Story
Smith v. Commissioner,177 a Tax Court case, reveals the different
effect third-party manipulation of settlement can have in an Article I
court from the effect in an Article III court. In Smith, Mr. and Mrs.
Smith and Mr. and Mrs. Jacobson had been partners in a real estate
venture that had generated large gains.' 78 In order to lower the tax
liability on these gains, they had purchased silver "straddles" from
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith (Merrill Lynch).179 The strad-
dles were designed to create losses in silver futures'8 0 in one year that
would be offset by gains in the following year, allowing postponement
of short-term capital gains from one tax year until the next, and de-
pending on the price movement of silver, the underlying commodity,
possible conversion of short-term capital gain into tax-advantaged
long-term capital gain.' 81 Merrill Lynch only offered these straddles
to clients in a fifty percent or higher tax bracket, and received a com-
mission of ten percent of the taxes saved.182 Silver straddles were used
because silver was a highly stable commodity, minimizing the risk of
economic loss.' 8 3
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited the couples and dis-
allowed the deductions for the silver futures on which the couples had
realized losses.'84 The IRS had ruled in 1977 that silver straddle losses
were nondeductible because there was no real risk of economic
loss.' 8 5 At the time of Smith, the IRS had several thousand straddle
177 78 T.G. 350 (1982).
178 See id. at 351.
179 See November 3, 1980 Tax Court Transcript at 58, 60-61, Smith, 78 T.G. at 350
(No. 12709-77) [hereinafter Smith Transcript].
180 "A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell a commodity at some future
date for a specified price." Jerry Knight, IRS Seeks to Halt "Silver Butterfly" Tax Write-
Offs, WASH. PosT, Apr. 6, 1981, at Al.
181 See Smith, 78 T.G. at 352. A small economic loss could occur. See id. at 352-53;
see also Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., An Examination of the Effect of Recent Legislation on
Commodity Tax Straddles, 2 VA. TAx REv. 165, 167 n.12 (1983) ("Because the legs of the
straddle tend to move in opposite directions with any increasing loss on one leg being
balanced by increasing profit on the other, the risk of the straddle transaction is lim-
ited to the spread, or difference in value, of the legs of the straddle when the taxpayer
first enters into the transaction.").
182 See Smith Transcript at 22, 24; Jerry Knight, Regan's Firm Pushed Tax Avoidance
Deals, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1980, at Al.
183 See Jerry Knight, Silver Butterfly "The Best Little Tax Dodge in America," WASH.
PoST, Dec. 21, 1980, at Gi.
184 The IRS had sent the taxpayers a notice of deficiency dated October 7, 1977.
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion at 6.
185 See Rev. Rul. 77-185, 1977-1 C.B. 48. This ruling involved a simple straddle,
however, not a "butterfly" straddle such as the one involved in Smith.
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loss cases under consideration.' 8 6 Smith was the Tax Court's first case
on the issue, however.' 8
7
As a result of the IRS's disallowance of their tax losses, the Smiths
and the Jacobsons sued Merrill Lynch in California state court 8
Merrill Lynch, apparently fearing an unfavorable Tax Court prece-
dent that would eliminate its profitable straddle business, 8 9 settled
the case with the couples' 90 for twice the amount of the federal tax
liability in dispute.' 9 ' Accordingly, approximately a week before trial
was scheduled to begin, 19 2 the couples offered in Tax Court to con-
cede the tax liability.' 93 The IRS refused to accept the offer.19 4 Judge
Nims rejected the couples' concession, apparently concerned that
Merrill Lynch was interfering in the case to prevent a precedent.195
Article I of the Constitution did not preclude the Tax Court from
hearing the case. Thus, trial went forward as scheduled, despite the
taxpayers' 96 stated desire to concede the case. 19 7 After trial, the court
186 See W. John Moore, Wounded IRS Takes Aim on Tax Straddle Plans, LEGAL TIMES,
Apr. 12, 1982, at 1 (quoting IRS Reply Brief).
187 See Smith, 78 T.C. at 362.
188 See Smith Transcript at 40, 59; see also Moore, supra note 188, at 1.
189 See Smith Transcript at 40, 59. The business apparently had earned millions of
dollars in commissions. See id.
190 SeeJerry Knight, Court Won't Let 2 Couples Drop Suit Against IRS, WASH. POST,
Nov. 4, 1980, at D7.
191 See id. The excess amount over the couples' $57,000 tax deficiency was proba-
bly to cover the interest on the deficiency, their California state tax liability and inter-
est. See I.R.C. §§ 6601, 6621 (West Supp. 1999) (regulating/governing interest on
underpayments of tax); Smith Transcript at 29 (stating that $114,000 would probably
cover their deficiencies plus interest; rate of interest was 18%). However, the IRS
argued that the $114,000 exceeded the aggregate of those amounts. See id. at 12;
Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioners' Notice of Concession at 3 & n.1.
192 The concession was offered on November 3. See Smith Transcript at 1. The
trial had been scheduled for November 10, 12, and 13, and December 16 and 17. See
id. at 44.
193 See id. at 2, 66.
194 See id. at 63-67; Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion at 1. It is unclear
whether the taxpayers' settlement of the suit against Merrill Lynch was contingent on
their full concession offer, and whether they received the $114,000 despite Judge
Nims' refusal to dismiss the case. Smith is paradigmatic of the effect of a repeat player
on one side of the litigation. The IRS would not accept the taxpayers' full concession
because it valued the precedent more than the cost of litigating the case.
195 See Smith Transcript at 48; infra note 212 and accompanying text; cf. Mootness,
supra note 89, at 1692 (stating that where the mootness doctrine "perpetually frus-
trate [s] 'the vital importance of keeping open avenues ofjudicial review,'" the need
for review overrides the policies of mootness, and "the Court should not refuse review
on the basis of mootness") (quoting Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 52 (1968)).
196 A taxpayer is "any person subject to any internal revenue tax." I.R.C.
§ 7701 (a) (14) (West Supp. 1999). In the context of Smith, the taxpayers were the two
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ruled in favor of the IRS on the underlying issue on the ground that
the taxpayers had not entered into the straddles for profit.198
2. The Effects of Smith
The Tax Court, like other courts,199 is pro-settlement. 200 In fact,
Tax Courtjudges often encourage settlement.20' In addition, the Tax
Court has held that, as a matter of policy, it is subject to "case or con-
troversy" restrictions, 20 2 particularly because its decisions are review-
couples, the Smiths and theJacobsons, litigating their tax dispute against the IRS. See
Smith, 78 T.C. at 350.
197 See Smith, 78 T.C. at 350; Smith Transcript at 66-67.
198 See Smith, 78 T.C. at 350. Ironically, the IRS's victory was bittersweet. The
court's rejection of the IRS's argument that the silver straddles had no economic
substance preserved the possibility that other taxpayers with a bona fide, if ill-
founded, profit motive could deduct their losses. See IRS to Pursue Past Straddle Abuses,
as Industry Circles Wagons, SEC. WIL, Sept. 6, 1982, at 6 ("IRS also lost a major straddle
test in tax court last spring in the Smith-Jacobson case. In that decision, attorneys
point out, the service may have 'won the battle but lost the war.' Straddling by Smith
andJacobson was deemed to be tax-motivated, but the court refused to go along with
the IRS's belief in the general invalidity of straddling under pre-1981 law."). The IRS
moved for reconsideration of the case, in search of a broader, sweeping precedent.
See Moore, supra note 188, at 1. The motion was denied. See id. The IRS continued
to litigate the issue, see Landreth v. Commissioner, 859 F.2d 643, 644 (9th Cir. 1988)
(citing cases), prompting Congress to act, see id.; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 98-861, at
916-17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 697, 1445, 1604-05. In 1984, Congress
enacted a provision governing the tax treatment of pre-1981 commodity straddles. See
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 108(a), 98 Stat. 494, 630 (stating
that losses from the disposition of one or more positions in a commodity straddle
entered into before June 23, 1981 are deductible if the loss was incurred in a transac-
tion entered into for profit). The provision eclipsed Smith in that it provided a statu-
tory rule. See Miller v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 827, 834, 842 (1985), rev'd, 836 F.2d
1274 (10th Cir. 1988).
199 See infra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
200 See, e.g., Barrett v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 713, 720 (1991) ("The policy of the
law is to foster the peaceful settlement of disputes without litigation."); Tate & Lyle,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (RIA) 661 (1996). The Tax Court generally will not
retain jurisdiction after the parties have agreed to a settlement. See LTV Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 64 T.C. 589 (1975).
201 See Lederman, supra note 48; Meade Witaker, Some Thoughts on Current Tax
Practice, 7 VA. TAx REv. 421, 435 (1988) ("Most litigants before the Tax Court are
aware that this court encourages settlement of valuation cases, because a settlement
by the parties usually results in a better decision at a much earlier date.").
202 As a practical matter, unripe cases cannot be litigated in Tax Court because a
notice of deficiency from the IRS and timely responsive petition are jurisdictional
requirements. See I.R.C. §§ 6214, 6512(b) (West Supp. 1999); Leandra Lederman,
Civilizing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of Deficiency,
30 U.C. DAvis L. Rxv. 183 (1996). Similarly, these requirements mean that a taxpayer
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able by the courts of appeals. 20 3 In an Article III court, the full
concession by the Smiths and the Jacobsons would have rendered the
case moot.20 4 Yet, Judge Nims never mentioned the possibility that
the case was moot,20 5 nor did the parties' Memoranda of Law.2 0 6
must have standing in order to petition the Tax Court. Payment of the deficiency
prior to issuance of a notice of deficiency has been held to eliminate Tax Court juris-
diction on the theory that the notice of deficiency is not valid, even if that is contrary
to the parties' intent. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. McMahon, 244 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir.
1957) ("[I]f prior payment has extinguished the 'deficiency,' there is no jurisdiction
in the Tax Court even though this be contrary to the intention of the parties."); Bend-
heim v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1954); McConkey v. Commissioner,
199 F.2d 892, 893-94 (4th Cir. 1952); Anderson v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 841, 842
(1948). In addition, settled cases are generally entered by the court as stipulated
decisions which means that the court does not generally require parties to continue
litigating moot cases.
203 See Anthony v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 367 (1976). Tax Court cases are some-
what less path-dependent than cases in other courts. If a Court of Appeals case is
squarely on point in the Court of Appeals to which appeal would lie, which is the
circuit in which the taxpayer resided at the time he petitioned the court, then that
precedent controls the Tax Court outcome. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742
(1970), affd on other grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). In cases where there is
no Court of Appeals precedent on point, the Tax Court develops its own rule, making
those cases path-dependent because individual judges decide each case. But cf
Caminker, supra note 78, at 824 n.28 ("The Tax Court most starkly illustrates the duty
[to obey hierarchical precedent's] path-dependent nature. Tax Court decisions are
reviewable by Article III courts of appeals; which court will review a decision depends
on factors such as where the disputed tax return was filed. When the Tax Court can
identify in advance the court of appeals with revisory jurisdiction over a particular
case, the Tax Court adheres to that court's precedents. Hence the Tax Court may
decide similar cases differently because they are appealable to different federal
circuits.").
204 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
205 If the IRS had accepted the taxpayers' concession and subsequently requested
the Tax Court to decide the issue anyway, the Tax Court's willingness to do so would
depend on whether the parties had actually entered into a settlement agreement, and
whether that agreement had been entered by the court as a stipulated decision. If a
party backs out after accepting a concession, but prior to executing a decision docu-
ment, the Tax Court treats that somewhat similarly to a unilateral full concession offer
rejected by the other party, but balances that party's prior acceptance of the conces-
sion. See, e.g., Greenlee v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 957, 959 (1985) ("In Mc-
Gowan the substantive issue before this Court affected many taxpayers and the public
interest required its resolution. This case is distinguishable in that only the petitioner
and Greenlee, Inc. will be affected by our decision."); Smith v. Commissioner, 34
T.C.M. (P-H) 1252 (1965) (accepting IRS's concession and issuing an opinion recit-
ing the facts of the case and acceptance of the concession). By contrast, if the parties
have actually entered into a settlement agreement and one party subsequently seeks
to be relieved of that agreement, the Tax Court takes a stricter stance.
The party seeking modification ... must show that the failure to allow the
modification might prejudice him .... Discretion should be exercised to
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Despite its pro-settlement policy and despite its general adher-
ence to justiciability concepts, on two prior occasions the Tax Court
had refused to dismiss cases in which one party tried to fully con-
cede.207 In both of those prior cases, it was the IRS that sought to
allow modification where no substantial injury will be occasioned to the op-
posing party, refusal to allow modification might result in injustice to the
moving party, and the inconvenience to the Court is slight.
Adams v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 359, 375 (1985) (citations omitted). However,
Judge Parr recently expressed her view that the Tax Court has a right to reject even a
bilateral settlement agreement.
I write separately... to emphasize that nothing in the majority opinion
should be understood to limit the sound discretion of the Court to reject an
agreement between the parties, where good cause is shown and the interests
ofjustice require it.
It is easy to imagine a situation, not here present, where an agreement
between the parties may not be in the interests of justice. For instance,
agreements that would abuse the process of this Court, or that would usurp
the Court's control over its calendar, or that would be contrary to sound
public policy should not be enforced.
Dorchester Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 320, 343 (1997) (Parr, J., concur-
ring). If the motion is on the eve of trial, and a trial date has been canceled in
reliance on the parties' purported settlement agreement,
the moving party ha[s] to satisfy standards akin to those applicable in vacat-
ing ajudgment entered into by consent: "In such cases, the parties are held
to their agreement without regard to whether the judgment is correct on the
merits." Absent a showing of lack of formal consent, fraud, mistake, or some
similar ground, a judgment entered by consent will be upheld.
Id. at 335 (reviewed by the full court) (quoting Stamm Int'l Corp. v. Commissioner,
90 T.C. 315, 322 (1988)); see also Mearkle v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 527, 528 (1986),
rev'd and remanded, 838 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1988).
Thus, if a stipulated decision had been entered, the Tax Court would be unlikely
to override the parties' agreement ending the Tax Court's involvement in the case
unless one party subsequently sought relief from that decision. In that situation, Mer-
rill Lynch would have been as successful in Smith as the Black Leadership Forum was
in Piscataway, discussed above, demonstrating that the agreement of the parties to the
case to a settlement is key, at least in Tax Court. See supra notes 132-78 and accompa-
nying text. Apparently, the Tax Court's position is that the parties' agreement is of
foremost importance. If the parties have agreed to a bilateral settlement and one
party later changes its mind, the court will apply a very deferential level of review
because agreement did exist at one time. On the other hand, if the objecting party
never accepted a full concession proposal, the Tax Court views the parties as still
litigating and therefore subject to its decision-making power.
206 See Smith Transcript; Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion; Memoran-
dum in Opposition to Petitioners' Notice of Concession.
207 See, e.g., McGowan v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 599 (1976) (stating that in the
interest of justice, Tax Court could retain jurisdiction despite the willingness of the
IRS to concede the entire case); Hisacres New Thought Ctr. v. Commissioner, 32
T.C.M. (P-H) 726 (1963) (holding for taxpayer in the underlying case despite tax-
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concede the case and the taxpayer who refused the concession. 208
Those cases were motivated by IRS fear of an unfavorable precedent,
and they differ conceptually from Smith in that the Tax Court's refusal
to dismiss cases where the IRS concedes but the taxpayer pushes for a
court decision may be motivated by prevention of IRS "manipulation"
of the court system. The IRS, unlike most taxpayers, is a repeat player
in Tax Court. In fact, the IRS is a party to every Tax Court deficiency
case. 209 Absent Tax Court action, the IRS theoretically could pursue
many taxpayers, then concede the ones in which a taxpayer with a
strong case petitions the Tax Court, counting on its ability to pursue
cases with more favorable facts later on. Smith raises no such possibil-
ity because the taxpayers, not the IRS, sought to concede the case.210
There are other cases in which the IRS sought entry of a decision and
the taxpayer resisted,21' but Smith is the only known case in which the
Tax Court actually sided with the IRS in such a situation, refusing to
enter a decision. 212
Regardless of whether the Tax Court considered the possibility
that the case should be dismissed as moot, it is clear thatJudge Nims's
unusual step in deciding a case despite a full concession by the taxpay-
ers was influenced by its perception that a non-party was interfering in
payer opposition to IRS motions to completely concede all issues); Smith Transcript at
2.
208 See McGowan, 67 T.C. at 599 (1976); Hisacres, 32 T.C.M. (P-H) at 726. Neither
case has been cited very often. McGowan was cited in one case for its substantive
outcome, and the court ruled consistently with it. See Trujillo v. Commissioner, 68
T.C. 670, 672 (1977). Hisacres has not been cited for its substantive position.
209 See Lederman, supra note 48, at 342.
210 Smith was therefore a case of first impression on this procedural issue. See
Smith Transcript at 63.
211 See, e.g., LTV Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 589 (1975). The reason why,
absent third-party intervention such as in Smith, a taxpayer might reject a "full conces-
sion" offered by the IRS in a Tax Court case is because of the nature of tax litigation.
Taxes are computed annually, and each year is a separate cause of action, so the Tax
Court's jurisdiction is over a particular tax year or years, specifically, those for which
the taxpayer received a notice of deficiency and timely petitioned the court. See Com-
missioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948). A "full concession" by the IRS might leave
the taxpayer open to subsequent disputes with the IRS in other years if the issue is a
recurring one, so the taxpayer might prefer to reject the concession and litigate in
order to obtain a precedent. Theoretically, the settlement amount could be adjusted
to compensate the taxpayer for this inconvenience, but the IRS is not in a position to
"bribe" a taxpayer to accept a settlement, or even to promise to forego audit of other
years. But cf. Doctors Hill & Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F.2d 204, 204-05 (6th
Cir. 1968) (describing a situation in which the IRS offered taxpayer company not only
the taxes claimed as a refund, but all the taxes the company had paid for that year).
212 See Smith Transcript at 63.
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the case to prevent a precedent.213 However, Merrill Lynch did noth-
ing wrong in pursuing its own interest. In fact, Merrill Lynch became
involved because the Smith taxpayers sued Merrill Lynch in state court
and because the IRS subpoenaed some of its documents.2 14 There is
nothing illegal in Merrill Lynch's settlement of the California state
court case in return for the taxpayers' agreement to concede the Tax
Court case. In a sense, Merrill Lynch was merely indemnifying the
taxpayers for their tax liability, plus an additional amount, 215 perhaps
to cover their costs of litigating the dispute with the IRS.
Because of Judge Nims's apparent aversion to Merrill Lynch's at-
tempt to eliminate a precedent, he applied the standards developed
in cases of IRS full concession, examining whether the interests of
justice would be served by entering a decision in accordance with the
concession, or instead by proceeding to trial. In those cases, the court
considered both whether the issues would likely be recurrent for the
particular taxpayer 216 and the potential precedential value of the
opinion.2 17 Where an issue will be recurrent for the particular tax-
payer but will have little precedential value for other taxpayers, the
Tax Court is likely to simply accept a concession.218
Thus, the Tax Court's primary consideration was the extent to
which other taxpayers would be affected by the precedent resulting
from its decision.2 19 The fact that, in Article III courts, third-party
benefits such as precedential value are irrelevant to the issue of
whether a case is moot220 did not enter the Tax Court's calculus in
Smith. In addition, Judge Nims did not distinguish between, on the
one hand, the IRS' ability, as a party to every Tax Court case, to ma-
213 Judge Nims seemed concerned about taxpayer "manipulation" of the system by
conceding, at the "eleventh hour," a case that was ready to go to trial. See Smith Tran-
script at 48.
214 See Smith Transcript at 57-59.
215 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
216 See, e.g., Hisacres New Thought Ctr. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 726
(1963) (finding in favor of taxpayer who opposed IRS motions to concede all issues
on the ground that the issues were recurrent).
217 See McGowan v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 599, 607-08 (rejecting IRS's conces-
sion where opinion would likely have precedential value to a large number of
taxpayers).
218 See Cape Fox Corp. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3184 (1992); cf LTV
Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 589 (1975).
219 Oddly enough, despite its interest in precedent, the Tax Court has a history of
selective disclosure of its opinions. Its opinions in small tax cases were not publicly
available for quite a while, in spite of the Code's requirements that Tax Court opin-
ions be public documents. See Leandra Lederman, Tax Court S Cases: Does the 'S' Stand
for Secret?, 79 TAx NoTs 257 (1998).
220 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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nipulate the court's docket through deciding which cases to pursue
and which to concede at which point, and on the other hand, the
taxpayer's responsive position in litigating a single Tax Court case.221
Judge Nims's decision, which ignored justiciability principles, re-
quired parties who were no longer adverse to continue litigating.222
III. BALANCING SETTLEMENT AND PRECEDENT
Settlement and precedent conflict because the former necessarily
precludes the latter.223 This Part explores the appropriate balance be-
tween private and public interests, in order to arrive at an appropriate
policy that balances both the need for settlement and the need for
precedent.
As Parts I and II of the article observed, litigants generally have
an economic incentive to settle.224 The possible precedential value of
a decision in their case matters to them only insofar as they are repeat
players who may themselves be affected by that precedent.2 25 Thus,
the private interest is generally settlement.
The public's interest is more complicated. The public benefits
from precedent.226 Thus, in general, the public has a stronger inter-
est in precedent than do private litigants. However, the public also
benefits from lowered public costs of litigation. This in turn implies a
need for settlement because, if the volume of trials increases, at some
point there may be a need to increase the number of judges or
courts-which are funded by public money. The public therefore has
some interest in a certain volume of settlements, but much less of an
incentive that any particular case settle than do the individual litigants.
221 Although the taxpayer is the one who actually brings Tax Court litigation,
functionally the taxpayer is the defendant. See Lederman, supra note 221.
222 The parties did disagree on whether the court should decide the case, but that
is not the kind of adversariness that leads to clear, partisan presentation of the under-
lying tax issues. They were no longer adversaries on those issues.
223 See Fiss, supra note 8, at 1085 ("In our political system, courts are reactive insti-
tutions. They do not search out interpretive occasions, but instead wait for others to
bring matters to their attention. They also rely for the most part on others to investi-
gate and present the law and facts. A settlement will thereby deprive a court of the
occasion, and perhaps even the ability, to render an interpretation.")
224 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
225 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
226 See Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushibi Kaishi v. U.S. Phillips Corp., 510 U.S. 27,
41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The public interest in preserving the work product of the
judicial system should always at least be weighed in the balance before such a motion
[vacatur] is granted."); see also supra text accompanying note 45.
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A. Why Do We Encourage Settlement?
Most courts and commentators express support for the settle-
ment of lawsuits.227 In fact, despite the high percentage of settle-
ments, 228 and the fact that economic models predict such a high
settlement percentage even without third-party intervention, 229 legal
rules favor settlement.230 Federal policy seems to favor settlement and
disfavor litigation, as reflected in the Civil Justice Reform Act,2 31 Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 68,232 Federal Rule of Evidence 408's ex-
clusion from evidence of settlements and settlement offers,23 3 and
statutory support for private contractual agreements to arbitrate
rather than litigate.23 4 Although settlement is generally a private mat-
ter, public processes are often used to encourage settlement.23 5 In
fact, most courts encourage settlement.23 6 Some courts have "settle-
227 See infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
228 See supra note 1.
229 See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
230 See Cordray, supra note 20, at 36 ("Settlement is favored in the law for a variety
of reasons. From a practical standpoint, settlements significantly ease the burden on
courts. When parties resolve their dispute through settlement rather than full litiga-
tion, the growing pressure on court dockets is relieved. Settlement thus enables
courts to conserve scarce judicial resources and to reduce their considerable backlog.
Settlement is, as a result, 'indispensable to judicial administration.'") (quoting Jan-
neh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 433, 435 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some
Cases), 83 GEo. L.J. 2663, 2665 (1995) ("While court administrators, judges, and some
lawyers suggest that we must continue to mine the advantages of settlement for
caseload reduction, or equity among claimants, especially in mass torts or class action
settings, many legal scholars continue to express concern with the use of settlement as
a device for resolving our legal disputes.") (citations omitted).
231 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994). It may encourage settlement. See Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 232, at 2665.
232 See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981) ("The purpose of
Rule 68 is to encourage the settlement of litigation.").
233 See Anne-Therese Bechamps, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the Public
Have a Right to Know?, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 117, 129 (1990) ("Unquestionably the
interest in encouraging settlements is important. The fact that the Federal Rules of
Evidence exclude settlements and offers of settlement from the realm of admissible
evidence is indicative of this strong public policy.").
234 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994) (regulating maritime transactions); see also 5
U.S.C. § 581 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (promoting alternative dispute resolution).
235 See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
236 See, e.g., In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 740
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986) (starting from "the familiar axiom
that a bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial."); Henry E. Klingeman,
Note, Settlement Pending Appeal: An Argument for Vacatur, 58 FoRDHAm L. REv. 233, 233
n.1 (1989) ("Districtjudges can encourage and participate in settlement negotiations
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ment weeks" or court-annexed arbitration, 23 7 and individual judges
use a variety of techniques to encourage settlement.238
The fact that public processes are used to encourage settlement is
initially surprising because precedent has public value,239 and settle-
ment is inconsistent with the possibility of a court decision that will
serve as precedent.240 Most cases would settle even without judicial
through conferences.... The circuit court may also require a prehearing confer-
ence.... Rule 33 provides in pertinent part that '[t] he court may direct the attorneys
for the parties to appear before the court or ajudge thereof for a prehearing confer-
ence to consider the simplification of the issues and such other matters as may aid in
the disposition of the proceeding by the court .... ' The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals employs staff counsel who conduct pre-argument settlement conferences.")
(citations omitted) (quoting FED. R. APp. P. 33); cf In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d
1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) ("It is hard to be against settlement."); Galanter & Cahill,
supra note 21, at 1368 ("In addition to settlement promotion by trial judges, there are
many settlement programs in other arenas, including at the appellate level. One suc-
cess story reported significant increases in the settlement rates achieved by an appel-
late prehearing program.").
237 See generally Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR" A
Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169 (1993).
238 See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 21, at 1387 ("Courts have taken a full turn
from settlement as accommodation within the structure of public rules to the disman-
tling of that structure as participants engage in the pursuit of settlement.").
239 See ERIK MOLLER ET AL., RAND CORP., PRIVATE DIsPuTE RESOLUTION IN THE
BANKING INDUSTRY 32 (1993) ("Cases that are resolved outside the traditional court
system cannot be used to test current judicial interpretation. Courts not only resolve
disputes but also establish, reinforce, and revise standards of conduct through their
written disputes. No private ADR mechanism can serve this function. And if whole
categories of cases are removed from public scrutiny, how appropriate changes in the
common law and in statutory interpretation might be accomplished becomes a seri-
ous question."); see also Monica L. Warmbrod, Comment, Could an Attorney Face Disci-
plinary Actions or Even Legal Malpractice Liability for Failure to Inform Clients of Alternative
Dispute Resolution?, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 791, 804 (1996) ("Even though the parties have
come to an agreement, settlement of some cases may deprive the public interest of
precedent and guidance for future conduct.") (citing H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed Is
Justice Ruined, 38 RurGERS L. REV. 431, 433 (1986)).
240 See supra note 3; Galanter & Cahill, supra note 21, at 1386-87.
Settlements have so captivated many judges and policymakers that general
effects are gladly sacrificed to secure settlements. Many courts are willing to
destroy or alter precedent in an adjudicated case for the sake of a subse-
quent settlement by the parties. In doing so, courts find more compelling
"the interests of private litigants in ending litigation through settlement"
than the interests of the public in the finality and precedential value ofjudg-
ments.... What makes the processes of vacatur and stipulated reversals so
interesting and disturbing is the willingness of courts to erase or manipulate
precedent to promote a settlement.
Id. (quoting Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional
Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589, 591 (1991)).
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intervention,241 so a logical question is why most courts and commen-
tators favor encouraging settlement when it will necessarily eliminate
potential precedent. The answer is partly a question of perspective.
The dispute resolution model simply does not focus on precedent, but
rather on a peaceful end to disputes.242 In other words, this viewpoint
looks at the benefits but not the costs of settlement.
One economic reason for courts to encourage settlement is that
parties do not internalize the costs to the public of continuing to liti-
gate.243 In effect, taxpayers as a whole subsidize trials by bearing
much of the costs of the public court system,244 perhaps distorting
somewhat the parties' financial incentives to settle.245 Prodding by
the court may help mitigate this distortion. On the other hand, tax-
payer subsidy of trials is appropriate since precedents benefit the tax-
paying public as well, 246 which suggests that the taxpayer subsidy is not
something parties should internalize.
Another possible reason to encourage settlement flows from the
standard economic model of suit and settlement discussed in Part I.
Under that model, parties factor in the costs of continuing to litigate
in deciding whether to propose a settlement or to accept a settlement
offered by the opposition. 247 As discussed above, finding a settlement
range depends on similar estimates of trial outcome by each side and
the absence of strategic behavior.248 Attorneys may help somewhat in
241 See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
243 Cf Purcell, supra note 130, at 904 ("Disputes between private litigants have
public significance for another reason: they are adjudicated in a public courtroom.
The courtroom is staffed by judges, clerks, and bailiffs whose salaries are paid by the
government. The costs of litigation are certainly burdensome, but the existence of
government courts allows litigants to avoid paying an arbitrator to hear their case.")
244 See, e.g., J.S. KAKATm & R.L. Ross, RAND CORP., COSTS OF THE CIViL JusTcE
SYSTEM: COURT ExPENDrTuREs FOR VAIuous TYPES OF CIVL CASES (1983), cited in Bru-
net, 1985 Survey of Books Relating to the Law: IV. Politics, Government and Public Affairs:
Measuring the Costs of Civil Justice, 83 MICH. L. REv. 916, 916 (1985) (stating that the
federal cost of civil litigation was $2.2 billion in fiscal year 1980); RicHARD POSNER,
ECONOuc ANALYSiS OF LAW 493 (3d ed. 1986) (stating that the government provides
judges' salaries and courthouses); Trubeck et al., supra note 30, at 78-79 ("[E]ven if
both lawyers and clients gain from litigation, it does not follow that litigation is a cost-
effective process for society. The simple fact that taxpayers rather than litigants pay
the cost of operating the courts shows why calculations of social and private costs must
diverge.").
245 SeeWilliam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics ofAnticipatory Adjudi-
cation, 23J. LEOAL STUD. 683, 689 (1994).
246 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
247 See Lederman, supra note 48; Shavell, supra note 31.
248 See Shavell, supra note 31.
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each of these areas.2 49 Importantly, however, the judge can help the
consistency of estimates by indicating his leanings on a particular is-
sue.2 50 The judge can help eliminate strategic behavior by collecting
settlement figures from each side and indicating whether there is an
overlap. 251 Judges have in fact employed both of these techniques, 252
and characteristics of the judge deciding the case are significant
predictors of the likelihood a case will settle.253
Although these are valid arguments in support of courts' tenden-
cies to encourage settlement, these probably are not the primary rea-
sons courts encourage settlement. Commentators who support
settlement advance two main reasons: cost savings to the parties and
alleviation of docket congestion. 254 Yet, the parties internalize cost
249 See Lederman, supra note 48; Rachlinski, supra note 60, at 171, 172 (explaining
that lawyers might frame settlement offers as "gains" rather than "losses," thus encour-
aging the client to settle, or they might do the opposite).
250 See Lederman, supra note 48.
251 See id.; cf Galanter &Cahill, supra note 21, at 1364 (" [B] ecause parties differ in
their ability to secure shares of these savings [from avoiding litigation], settlement
may add another layer of departure from equity. It is sometimes claimed thatjudicial
intervention can offset such an effect, leading to more equitable distribution of the
exchange surplus. But no systematic studies have examined this claim.") (footnote
omitted).
252 See Carlton M. Smith, Innovative Settlement Techniques Can Reduce Litigation Costs,
78 J. TAX'N 76, 80 (1993) ("[In a Tax Court chambers conference, the] judge also
may ask the parties if they would be interested in hearing the judge's tentative views
on how he or she would rule in the case, assuming the parties presented the evidence
they said they would present. The judge sometimes will give his or her views as a
percentage, as in: 'I think there is a 60% chance I will rule for the petitioner on this
issue.' Giving views in this way often lends to quick settlements on the stated percent-
age basis."). Smith also notes, "A less common form of mediation that the judges
employ in chambers conferences is to ask the parties if they would be willing to in-
form the judge of their settlement range without the other party being present. After
the parties jointly discuss the case with the judge, the judge will speak to the parties
separately (often with a law clerk present as a witness) to learn their settlement
ranges. If the judge sees an overlap in those ranges, he may call the parties back into
the room jointly and tell the parties that an overlap exists and even suggest a settle-
ment number that both parties could live with." Id.; see alsoJudith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376 (1982) ("Many federal judges have departed from
their.., relatively disinterested pose to adopt a more active, "managerial" stance. In
growing numbers, judges are not only adjudicating the merits of issues presented to
them by litigants, but also are meeting with parties in chambers to encourage settle-
ment of disputes and to supervise case preparation. Both before and after the trial,
judges are playing a critical role in shaping litigation and influencing results.").
253 See Lederman, supra note 48.
254 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional
Law Through Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589, 591 n.8 (1991) ("To the
extent that settlement has the effect of reducing docket congestion and resolving
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savings from settlement, so they do not seem to need a push for that
reason. Alleviating docket congestion apparently benefits litigants by
speeding up court resolution of their cases. 255 However, if litigants
are pressured to settle, the costs of docket congestion may be shifted
from future litigants (who would have to bear increased delay) to cur-
rent litigants,2 56 who bear the increased pressure.2 57
In fact, the argument that settlement helps eliminate docket con-
gestion does not hold true where the case at issue will provide prece-
dent to help settle numerous other cases. For example, in Smith v.
Commissioner,258 the IRS made that very argument as to why the Tax
Court should try the case rather than allow the two couples litigating
against the IRS to concede the case.2 59 Tax Court Judge Nims ac-
cepted the IRS's argument, stating,
cases without further consumption ofjudicial resources, it obviously serves public as
well as private interests.").
255 See Robert Scott Lewis, Recent Decision: U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner
Mall Partnership: Settlement Conditioned on Vacatur?, 47 Ai. L. REv. 883, 892 n.72
(1996) ("Much can be said for settlement; at a minimum it concludes one dispute and
allows scarce judicial resources to be used in other pending litigation.") (citing
Thomas D. Lambros, The Future of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 14 PEPP. L. REv. 801
(1987)).
256 Cf. In re Memorial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1303 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Judges must
have at heart the interests of other litigants in future cases, and hold them equal in
weight with the interests of today's.").
257 Cf. Fiss, supra note 8, at 1075 ("I do not believe that settlement as a generic
practice is preferable to judgment or should be institutionalized on a wholesale and
indiscriminate basis. It should be treated instead as a highly problematic technique
for streamlining dockets.").
258 78 T.C. 350 (1982), affd, 820 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1987).
259 See Smith Transcript at 10-11.
As Your Honor knows better than I do, the Court is being inundated with
petitions. When I became admitted to this Court; which was about eight
years ago; it was normal to have 8,000 or 9,000 cases a year. I believe that it's
no overstatement to say that this year approximately 20,000 cases will be
docketed ....
And what [Smith and Jacobson] have done is they have induced the
Respondent and the Court to waste its [sic] time ....
This court will now-as a result this Court will now be the recipient of
hundreds or thousands of domestic silver straddle cases which there's no
prospect of resolving. I think at this point it's interesting-the Court should
consider that we spent about six months getting this case ready for trial ....
There are 13 cases docketed before the Court with similar issues. Ifwe
devote our energies to those court cases and it happens again, there's no
doubt that two years down the road we could be in the same situation and
the Court will now have 3,000 domestic silver straddle cases.
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Are we going to gear up for trial after trial on a case by case basis,
and have Merrill Lynch coming in at the eleventh hour getting rid
of the case?
We simply can't operate that way, counsel. We've got 36,000
petitions pending in the Tax Court today. We can't spend all this
time. You know perfectly well how much time the Court has
spent.
2 6 0
Yet Smith is unusual; courts generally espouse favoring settlement, not
trial.261
The key to understanding the focus on docket congestion may
not actually be the effects on litigants but instead on the judges them-
selves: docket congestion affects judges because busy trial calendars
increase judges' workloads.2 62 Judges' desire to decrease their work-
load is a plausible explanation for courts' willingness to encourage
settlement.2 63 Judge Sarokin states, "The judiciary had developed a
siege mentality because of the size of its calendar, and settlement
rather than adjudication had become the battle cry of its mem-
bers."264 In fact, Judge Sarokin takes it even farther, stating,
The arguments that lawyers and judges use to convince litigants to
settle have become so standardized that they could be printed and
served with the complaint:
By settling this dispute:
260 Id. at 48.
261 See supra text accompanying note 236.
262 See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 21, at 1364 ("There has been a tremendous
push in recent years to encourage settlement with an eye to lowering the demands on
courts. By definition, settlements mean there is less that courts have to do.").
263 See Fiss, supra note 8, at 1086. ("I recognize that judges often announce settle-
ments not with a sense of frustration or disappointment, as my account of adjudica-
tion might suggest, but with a sigh of relief. But this sigh should be seen for precisely
what it is: It is not a recognition that ajob is done, nor an acknowledgment that ajob
need not be done because justice has been secured. It is instead based on another
sentiment altogether. Namely, that another case has been 'moved along,' which is
true whether or not justice has been done or even needs to be done. Or the sigh
might be based on the fact that the agony ofjudgment has been avoided."); cf. Rich-
ard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else
Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 21 (1993). If, by contrast, judges were paid by the
number of cases they tried, they would have an incentive to discourage settlement
unless settlements attracted more "business" in the form of cases filed there, instead
of in another court, that would go to trial. If they were paid by the number of suits
resolved, they might have an incentive to encourage settlement, in order to resolve
more cases in a given time period. Cf Willis L.M. Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situa-
tion in the United States, 13 AM.J. COMp. L. 187, 188-89 (1964) (asserting that historical
hostility to forum-selection clauses may partly be explained by judges being paid by
the case).
264 Sarokin, supra note 1, at 432.
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1. You save the cost of litigation.
2. You avoid the time, irritation, and emotion of a trial.
3. If you are the recipient of money, you will have its im-
mediate use.
4. If you are a payor, you avoid the possibility of a larger
verdict.
5. All uncertainties are eliminated-no one in a trial
knows what the final outcome will be.
6. The best result is a settlement with which no one is
completely satisfied.
2 65
Thus, judges' incentives to encourage settlement combine with
the general concept of resolving disputes peacefully, resulting in fa-
voritism of settlement. Parties generally have no incentive to push for
trial in the face of encouragement of settlement because, as discussed
above, they bear the litigation costs. 266 Absent a litigation subsidy,
parties who had reached an agreement in principle would be unlikely
to continue litigating even if encouraged to do so. 26
7
B. Is Precedent "Manipulation" Through Settlement Objectionable?
The discussion in Section A, above, reveals a backdrop of prefer-
ence for settlements over trials. Yet, the preference is weakened when
third parties who are otherwise uninvolved in the litigation, particu-
larly interest groups, have sought settlements of court cases for their
own reasons. Commentators may point out that this kind of settle-
ment allows "manipulation" of precedent, which is true. The current
system certainly permits manipulation of precedent through settle-
ment engineering, as in Piscataway; there is no remedy for those op-
posed to the Piscataway settlement, and no mechanism for reinstating
the case on the Court's docket. Yet any settlement alters the content
of precedent in a non-random way.268 Should the intention to influ-
ence precedent alter the permissibility of settlement? This Section
compares Piscataway and Smith in an attempt to answer the question
265 Id. at 432-33. But cf Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory
Groups and the CivilJustice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BRooy. L. REv. 879, 905 n.144 (1993)
("For this section, I excluded comments from judges. This one was typical, however.
'The [CivilJustice Reform Act] was well-intentioned, but based on two false premises:
[one of which is that] docket problems are the result of lazy federal judges (I work
harder now than when I was a lawyer).'").
266 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
267 No one should be forced to litigate against his will. Cf Fiss, supra note 8, at
1085 (arguing that parties should not be forced to commence litigation). But see
Smith Transcript (requiring taxpayer couples to continue litigating despite their ex-
pressed desire to concede the case).
268 See supra text accompanying note 48.
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of whether third-party manipulation of precedent through settlement
is objectionable.
1. Third-Party Manipulation in Piscataway
What is wrong with interest group financing of settlements? At
first glance, interest group financing of the Piscataway settlement is
analogous to interest group financing of test cases, discussed above. 269
However, one difference between these situations is that in Piscataway
Ms. Taxman herself received the portion of the settlement that did
not go to her lawyer, whereas in test cases, the plaintiff receives from
the interest groups only financial assistance in the litigation; any pay-
ment to the plaintiff in test cases normally will come from the defend-
ant. Nothing prevents interest groups from providing financial
support to the plaintiff during the litigation.270 However, Ms. Taxman
presumably was not someone the Black Leadership Forum was inter-
ested in helping; the payoff to Ms. Taxman was made by groups that
substantively disagreed with her position and were trying to "buy oft"
the litigation to avoid a precedent,271 rather than trying to advance
Ms. Taxman's cause. Yet it is not as if the civil rights groups bribed
the Piscataway school board or its members to vote to settle a case they
were actually eager to litigate. Instead, the money provided by inter-
est groups was paid to Ms. Taxman, the plaintiff, and her attorney.
Ms. Taxman and the school board settled their dispute by mutual
agreement, and the taxpayers of Piscataway Township were spared the
full burden of the settlement. If the interest groups had been pre-
cluded from contributing to the settlement, it might have meant that
the local taxpayers would simply have borne a larger share.272
The fact that Ms. Taxman arguably was "bought off" by the civil
rights groups raises the point that Ms. Taxman was in a position to
reject the settlement if she objected to the means by which the Piscat-
away school board financed it. In fact, she could even have agreed to
settle with Piscataway Township only on the condition that the settle-
ment not be funded by interest groups. This reveals that no one,
other than the parties to Piscataway, had the right to put conditions
on the terms of the settlement. In our litigant-controlled system,273
269 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
270 See supra text accompanying note 104.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 149-51.
272 Of course, it is possible that the case would not have settled without the inter-
vention of the civil rights groups. But since it is the parties' right to agree to settle a
case, the fact that money towards the settlement was provided by third parties, with no
strings attached, does not seem objectionable.
273 See Zellar, supra note 18, at 871.
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only the parties can determine what terms of a settlement are accepta-
ble or unacceptable to them. In effect, Ms. Taxman was in the posi-
tion of protecting the principle for which she was suing, so she was in
a position to name the price for which she would compromise that
principle. Piscataway therefore represents what is perhaps a side effect
of the adversarial system of case resolution. The system works because
of the parties' incentives; the interests of non-parties are not repre-
sented despite the externalities, such as precedent or lack of
precedent.
Assuming for the moment that the Piscataway settlement was
nonetheless objectionable, there are two theoretically possible ways to
prevent such situations from arising in the future. One would be to
prohibit interest group financing of settlements. This might prevent
some settlements, which conflicts with the general policy in favor of
settlement. However, in this context, the public value of precedent
might outweigh the policy in favor of settlement. Yet it seems unlikely
that such a law would be enforceable. In fact, any third party contri-
bution to a settlement is analogous to interest-group contributions be-
cause in any such situation, the contributing party has an interest of its
own it is attempting to further through the contribution. 274
Another tack to prevent the recurrence of situations like the one
in Piscataway would be to adopt ChiefJustice Rehnquist's approach to
mootness doctrine, viewing it as merely guided by Article II, not man-
dated, so that the Supreme Court could or would hear all cases settled
after the grant of certiorari.2 75 However, such a rule seems overbroad
when Piscataway is looked at as the impetus. No one cried out for
prohibition of settlement of docketed Supreme Court cases when Bon-
274 Piscataway provided an easier case in which to engineer a settlement than some
employment discrimination cases because only monetary damages were at issue; Ms.
Taxman had been reinstated after a two-year hiatus. See Linda Greenhouse, Affirma-
tive Action Settlement: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at Al. The settlement
was only for the back pay and fringe benefits the District Court had ordered, plus
interest, not for punitive damages or emotional distress damages.
275 See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330 (1988) (Rehnquist, GJ., concurring)
("Such a rule would likely have three effects: (1) The number of petitions for certio-
rari might decline slightly, as parties and their attorneys become aware of the obliga-
tion and liability to see the case through to decision; (2) it would likely discourage
settlements after certiorari had been granted, since the settlement would be meaning-
less (assuming a Court decision post-settlement would apply to the parties too, not
just as precedent for third parties); and (3) it might encourage settlements between
the time of the petition for certiorari and the decision on the petition.").
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ner Mal127 6 was settled. True, Piscataway might have had farther-reach-
ing implications, but the main cause of the outcry about the
settlement was the financial contribution of an interest group.277 Re-
quiring docketed Supreme Court cases to go forward would not pre-
vent interest-group financing of settlements at the court of appeals or
state supreme court levels, for example.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach would also require parties to
litigate a case both sides wish to drop.2 7 8 This raises reasons to dismiss
the case that are at least as compelling as the potential value of the
precedent. The parties would be subsidizing the precedent without
any real benefit to them. 2 79 This is worse even than Smith, where only
one litigating party was subsidizing precedent against his will. Even
worse, when the parties are no longer adversarial, they will no doubt
not develop their positions as much or litigate as forcefully, 28 0 affect-
ing the court's ability to make an informed decision.
2. Third-Party Manipulation in Smith
As it happens, the Smith precedent was not a particularly impor-
tant one. Smith was superseded by statute soon after it was decided,28 1
so it has rarely been cited for its substantive holding on tax strad-
276 See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 20
(1994). That case settled after the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of
certiorari and was briefed on the merits of the case. See supra note 91.
277 See supra note 165.
278 Cf Fiss, supra note 8, at 1085 (stating that parties should not be forced to
commence litigation).
279 That is, generally a person will incur the costs of litigation, rather than fail to
bring suit or settle a lawsuit that has been brought, because the expected value to that
person is greater than the expected value of the alternatives. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
280 See Gail S. Coleman, Overcoming Mootness in the H-2A Temporary Foreign
Farmworker Program, 78 GEo. L.J. 197, 217 (1989) ("Moot disputes, often of little im-
portance to either party, are seldom argued with the zeal or passion of adversaries in a
live dispute."); Lee, supra note 35, at 668 ("A proceeding between litigants who lack a
truly adversarial posture is far less likely to produce a high quality decision than a
proceeding between genuinely hostile litigants.").
281 See Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 108, 98 Stat. 630 (1984) (amended 1986) (enacted by
the Tax Reform Act of 1984); see also Miller v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 827, 842 (1985)
("The legislative history makes it clear that Congress was aware of the Commissioner's
litigating position on straddles and of our decision in Smith v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
350 (1982)."). In 1986, Congress amended § 108 of the 1984 Act to clear up conflict-
ing interpretations. See Pub. L. 99-514, § 1808(d), 100 Stat. 2817; Tway v. Commis-
sioner, 63 T.C.M. (RIA) 212 (1993).
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dles.2 8 2 Congress would likely have acted even without the Smith deci-
sion, because the IRS continued to litigate the issue post-Smith.28 3 In
fact, another case would likely have made it to Tax Court shortly after-
wards, particularly because thousands were pending at the IRS, 284 and
eventually one of these cases would have been tried.
In effect, the Tax Court in Smith required the Smiths, the Jacob-
sons, and the IRS to bear the burden of litigation that was relevant to
the IRS and third parties, but not to the Smiths or the Jacobsons. As
discussed above, generally parties who had reached an agreement in
principle would be unlikely to continue litigating even if encouraged
to do so because of the value of the potential precedent, absent a
subsidy of their litigation costs. The Tax Court did not subsidize the
Smiths' and the Jacobsons' costs. The Smiths and the Jacobsons con-
tinued to litigate only because the Tax Court required them to do so,
eliminating their autonomy to concede the case. Yet third parties
benefitted because precedent is a public good.2 8 5 In contrast to Smith,
Ms. Taxman's settlement with the Piscataway school board preserved
her autonomy to decide that she preferred a settlement, even if the
settlement was funded by non-parties with interests adverse to hers to
continued litigation.28 6
CONCLUSION
Even without outside encouragement, the most likely outcome of
any dispute is settlement before trial, simply because each party has an
282 See, e.g., Kirchman v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1494 (11th Cir. 1989) (cit-
ing Smith for proposition that Tax Court must examine the entire transaction); Po-
lakof v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 321, 324 n.6 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Smith for
proposition that subjective intent at time taxpayer entered transaction is determina-
tive of profit motive); Dewees v. Commissioner, 870 F.2d 21, 35 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing
Smith for proposition that uncorroborated testimony that transaction was entered into
for profit lacks probative value); United States v. Atkins, 661 F. Supp. 491, 495
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 869 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Smith for proposition that
existence of profit motive is a fact question on which taxpayer bears burden of proof).
But cf. Tway v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (RIA) 212 (1993); Stoller v. Commissioner,
59 T.C.M. (P.H.) 659 (1990); Miller v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 827 (1985), rev'd, 836
F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1988).
283 See supra note 198.
284 See supra note 261. In fact, at one point in 1984, 4400 cases involving pre-1981
commodity straddles were docketed in the Tax Court. See Landreth, 859 F.2d at 645
n.4.
285 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
286 In fact, Ms. Taxman may have been quite happy to take money away from an
interest group that advanced interests that may indirectly have led to her layoff.
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economic incentive to settle.28 7 In part, this Article has sought to ex-
plain our general policy in favor of settlement, as such a policy ap-
pears superfluous. The Article has pointed out that courts have an
incentive to encourage settlement-namely, reducing their wor-
kloads. Scholarly encouragement of furtherance of settlement is
therefore unnecessary unless it helps litigation parties find a settle-
ment range. Even then, settlement is only valuable if the increase in
the parties' and court's aggregate welfare is not more than offset by
the reduction in the welfare of the taxpaying public who benefits from
precedents.
The benefits of precedent are often overlooked in discussions
about settlement, perhaps because of the inherent bias of the "dispute
resolution" model of litigation, which views precedent as a side effect
of resolving the parties' dispute. One positive effect of the contro-
versy over the Piscataway settlement is that it raised awareness of the
effect of settlement on the content of case law precedent. In fact,
public reaction to the Piscataway settlement, which included objection
to "docket manipulation," reveals the importance of the dispute reso-
lution view in the tendency to encourage settlement.
Precedent has public value, and its content is altered by settle-
ments. In fact, settlement is nonrandom, so even settlements made
with no thought of the effect of the settlement on a body of precedent
influence the substantive content of the body of precedent. Settle-
ment, or refusal to settle, can also be a conscious manipulation of
precedent. Because precedent is path-dependent, interest groups can
manipulate the substance of a body of case law by choosing to bring
and not to settle cases with favorable facts, and by engineering settle-
ments in unfavorable cases, as the civil rights groups did in Piscataway.
Settlement is an integral part of our justice system, which pro-
vides litigation parties with autonomy in the decision whether to settle
a case. 28 8 Therefore, we have to at least tolerate settlement, despite its
alteration of the content of precedent. Intentional engineering of a
settlement might seem to differ from party autonomy, since it involves
a third party. However, no third party can engineer a settlement with-
out the agreement of the litigation parties. Smith is a good example of
that; Merrill Lynch put up the money, but the IRS refused to settle
287 See supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
288 See Cordray, supra note 20, at 9 ("American law treats the settlement agree-
ment as a member of the larger family of private contracts."); see also Zellar, supra
note 18, at 871 ("[Llitigation is party-initiated and party-controlled."); Galanter &
Cahill, supra note 21, at 1371 (1994) ("[Settlement] ... involves a process of compro-
mise in the sense that each has sacrificed some part of his claim in order to secure
another part.").
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with the taxpayers. Thus, even in the third-party interest-group con-
text, settlement is a matter of party autonomy. Forcing parties to lit-
gate in spite of a desire to settle does not mesh with the principles
underlying the adversary system. Even in Smith, where one party did
want to continue litigating, overriding the other party's autonomy to
concede the dispute was a costly way to develop precedent.
Smith is of course an exceptional situation. Even the Tax Court
does not normally require non-adverse parties to continue litigating.
The justice system would grind to a halt if cases were prohibited from
settling. Even with the small percentage of disputes that result in pre-
cedent, numerous cases are decided each year, adding to the body of
precedent. Perhaps Piscataway might have been one of them, had not
the civil rights groups contributed financially to the settlement. We
will never know-settlement happens.
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